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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. INTENT OF THE PRACTICE AID 
The objective of this Practice Aid is to provide guidance to practitioners with business and/or 
litigation experience concerning intellectual property rights and calculating damages for in-
fringements thereof. This Practice Aid focuses on the theoretical, legal, economic, and account-
ing foundations of intellectual property and methodologies commonly employed in the calcula-
tion of damages.  
The first section of this Practice Aid provides an overview of the patent, trademark, and copy-
right law in the United States. The second section of this Practice Aid addresses the calculation 
of damages arising from the infringement of intellectual property. There are also several appendi-
ces to this Practice Aid. Refer to Appendixes A, “Intellectual Property Print and Electronic Re-
sources,” and B, “Intellectual Property Professional Associations.” Appendix C, “Summary of 
Intellectual Property Cases,” provides a listing of relevant case law. These cases provide insight 
as to the methods and procedures accepted by United States courts in the calculation of dam-
ages. However, the practitioner is cautioned that these court cases provide only general guid-
ance; the facts and circumstances of each engagement are controlling and may dictate the choice 
of appropriate methodology.1  
1.2. OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The ability to manage, value, and exploit intellectual capital2 has become a significant corporate 
objective. Investors and shareholders alike are investing more in intellectual capital today than in 
the past, because it tends to yield a higher return on investment than other corporate assets.3 Cur-
rently, the innovation process—seeking new ways of meeting market demand—appears to be 
yielding the highest return on investment.4 As a result, many companies are making huge in-
vestments into intellectual capital, in part as a means of spurring innovation.  
 
                                                 
1
 In addition, the precedential value of intellectual property case law undergoes change as appellate and other courts 
publish new decisions. Because a new decision can affect the application of law immediately, current precedent should 
be carefully reviewed with counsel before a practitioner relies on the cases cited in Appendix C. 
2 
  Intellectual capital must be distinguished from intellectual property. Intellectual capital consists of human capital 
(people) and structural capital (e.g., internal processes and structures, databases, customer relationships, patents, trade-
marks, trade secrets and copyrights).  
3 http://www.juergendaum.com/mybook_i.htm, (2004), “Interviews from Juergen Daum’s book, Intangible Assets and 
Value Creation.” 
4
 Ibid. 
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The World Intellectual Property Organization has addressed this trend: 
IP assets are gaining ground as a measure of corporate viability and future performance. In 
1982, some 62 percent of corporate assets in the United States of America were physical as-
sets, but by 2000, that figure had shrunk to a mere 30 percent . . . A recent study shows that, 
on average, 40 percent of the value of a company is not shown in any way on its balance 
sheet. For this reason, IP is sometimes referred to as a “hidden value”. Whether hidden or 
expressly valued, it is now clear that patents, copyrights, trademarks, geographical indica-
tions and trade secrets are significant contributors to enterprise value.5 
Some historical examples of high-profile patent infringement cases demonstrate how intellectual 
property disputes can involve millions or even billions of dollars. For instance: 
• In Michelson v. Medtronic, over $1 billion changed hands when Medtronic was required to pay 
Michelson $400 million in punitive damages for patent infringement, another $159 million in 
unpaid royalties and other sums.6 
• In Honeywell v. Minolta, a $96 million judgment was entered against Minolta for its infringe-
ment of Honeywell’s patented autofocus camera technology. Based on that judgment, Honey-
well was able to license out its technology to other major camera manufacturers, netting it 
$400 million in additional income.7 
Given the magnitude of the dollars at stake, the development and protection of intellectual prop-
erty has become a high priority among analysts and business leaders. This trend was addressed 
by Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan at the 2003 Financial Markets Conference of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Sea Island, Georgia: 
Before World War I, markets in this country were essentially uninhibited by government 
regulations, but they were supported by rights to property, which in those years largely 
meant physical property. Intellectual property—patents, copyrights, and trademarks—
represented a far less important component of the economy, which was mainly agricultural   
. . . Only in recent decades, as the economic product of the United States has become so pre-
dominantly conceptual, have issues related to the protection of intellectual property rights 
come to be seen as significant sources of legal and business uncertainty.8 
In light of the critical role played by intellectual property in the current global economy, identify-
ing, managing and protecting these assets are essential functions for many businesses. Certified 
Public Accountants (CPAs) with specialized training in consulting and valuation can provide 
                                                 
5
 World Intellectual Property Organization, “Intellectual Property—A Powerful Tool for Economic Growth”, Chapter 3. 
http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/dgo/wipo_pub_888/index_wipo_pub_888.html. 
6
 Kirkland and Ellis LLP, Deals & Suits: Michelson v. Medtronic, Jan. 1, 2005, www.kirkland.com. 
7
 Honeywell’s Chief Financial Officer during this period, Christopher J. Steffen, believes that “[a]s our economy 
becomes less manufacturing oriented, intellectual property becomes a much more important asset and represents a 
great deal of what shareholders have given a company to invest.” Myers, R. (March 1998). Fighting Words: 
Growing ranks of litigants are putting price tags on ideas, CFO.Com, CFO Publishing Corporation, New York 
(http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/2989975/c_3046551?f=insidecfo.) 
8
 http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2004/200402272/default.htm (2004). 
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their clients with professional assistance in this area, helping them manage their intellectual 
property assets, supporting them in license negotiations, calculating damages, and perform-
ing other important functions. 
1.3. OVERVIEW OF TRADITIONAL FORMS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
A central premise of United States intellectual property law is to foster innovation by affording 
innovators certain rights in connection with their innovations. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of 
the United States Constitution specifically authorized Congress to enact patent and copyright 
laws. The federal trademark laws were authorized more generally in the Constitution, pursuant to 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3, which states, “Congress shall have power . . . to regulate com-
merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with Indian Tribes.”9 
The following sections of this Practice Aid present an overview of the patent, trademark, and 
copyright systems in the United States. Each section addresses the nature of the rights protected, 
property considerations, the formal registration processes, and enforcement considerations. A 
summary of trade secret law is also included.  
Given the broad and ever-expanding nature of intellectual property law and practice, this Practice 
Aid is not intended to be exhaustive in nature. It is presented for information purposes and in the 
context of litigation services engagements performed by CPAs. 
1.3.1. Patent Overview 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution specifically authorized Congress 
to enact patent laws.10 Patents provide an economic incentive for inventors to publish their inven-
tions and discoveries. In order to qualify for patent protection, inventions and discoveries 
should represent a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.”11 In addition to patents for utilitarian inven-
tions (utility patents), patents are available for certain ornamental designs (design patents), and 
certain plants (plant patents). Utility patents may be granted to anyone who invents or discovers 
any new and useful process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter, or any 
new and useful improvement thereof; design patents may be granted to anyone who invents a 
new, original, and ornamental design for an article of manufacture; and plant patents may be 
granted to anyone who invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and new vari-
ety of plant. 
                                                 
9
 Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution. 
10
 Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution also authorized Congress to enact copyright laws.  
11
 35 USC § 101. 
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Damages for patent infringement are governed by Title 35, Section 284 of the U.S. Code, which 
states that “[u]pon finding for the claimant the court shall award the claimant damages adequate 
to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use 
made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.”12  
This section provides for two distinct measures of damages in a patent infringement case, 
namely, (1) lost profits, but (2) in no event less than a reasonable royalty. 
The focus of damage analysis in a patent infringement dispute typically starts with the lost prof-
its suffered by the patent holder. The goal of lost profits, where appropriate, is to award the pat-
ent holder damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a rea-
sonable royalty. If, in all reasonable probability, the patent holder would have made the sales 
that the infringer made, the patent holder is entitled to recover the profits it would have earned 
from the sales denied it as a result of the infringement.13   
A variety of special damage issues arise if the patent-in-suit is a design patent. As with utility 
patents, lost profits or a reasonable royalty are available in litigation concerning the infringement 
of a design patent. The Patent Act, however, also permits design patent owners to seek damages 
in an amount equal to the infringer’s profit14 as an alternative remedy. But a design patent owner 
may not recover both the infringer’s profit and a reasonable royalty; it must elect one or the 
other. Additionally, a patent owner may not recover a reasonable royalty for infringement of a 
utility patent as well as profits for infringement of a design patent on the sale of a single product. 
The goal of assessing reasonable royalties in patent infringement cases is to place the infringed 
party in the same position that it would have been had it hypothetically negotiated a license for 
the patent. “When actual damages cannot be proved, [the] patent owner is entitled to  ‘reason-
able royalty,’ which is an amount which a person desiring to manufacture and sell a patented 
article, as a business proposition, would be willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make 
and sell the patented article in the market at a reasonable profit.”15 
1.3.1.1 The Patent Application Process 
In support of a utility patent application, an inventor will attempt to demonstrate to the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) that his or her invention has each of the following attributes: 
1. It is useful. 
2. It is new. 
                                                 
12
 35 USC § 284. 
13
 Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Industries, Inc., 251 F.2d 469 (Fifth Cir. 1958). 
14
 Under this alternative, the design patent owner is not only entitled to the profits of the infringer, but may also be enti-
tled to the profits of other sellers in the chain of distribution. 
15
 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (Sixth Cir. 1978). 
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3. It is not obvious. 
The applicant is required to file with the USPTO a set of formal papers, including a written pat-
ent application describing the invention, and pay a fee. The patent application description must 
include the specifications, the claims, and any necessary drawings.  
Section 112 of the United States Patent Act states that “the specification shall conclude with one 
or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the ap-
plicant regards as his invention.”16 The claims of a patent are the numbered paragraphs found at 
the end of a patent application, usually preceded by the phrase “I (we) claim” or “What is 
claimed is.” These claims define the boundaries of the patent right, as a deed stakes out the 
boundaries of real estate.17 
Upon receiving a patent application, the USPTO assigns it to a patent examiner for review.18  The 
examiner, who generally has expertise and/or training in the relevant technical field, reviews the 
patent application to determine whether the inventor has met the requirements for issuance of a 
patent. In addition to reviewing the application for indications of utility and form, the examiner 
ordinarily conducts a search for patents or other published literature (referred to as “prior art”) 
that preceded the patent application. The objective of this search is to determine whether the 
claimed invention is new and nonobvious in view of the prior art. 
In most cases, a patent application is pending within the USPTO between one and three years. 
This extended review period is the result of the large volume of patent applications filed and the 
labor-intensive examination process, which often involves extended communications between 
the USPTO, applicants, and their attorneys or agents. 
Under United States patent law, a patent application can be based either on (1) an existing 
invention, or (2) an existing idea of an inventor, even if the inventor has not physically 
built or tested the idea to see whether it works. A patent is granted for a term beginning on the 
date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for 
the patent was filed in the United States or, if the application contains a specific reference to an 
earlier filed application or applications under Section 120, 121, or 365(c) of Title 35, from the 
date on which the earliest such application was filed.19 
                                                 
16
 35 USC § 112. 
17
 Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric USA, 868 F.2d 1251, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
18
 The USPTO maintains the confidentiality of pending patent applications under Title 35, Section 122 of the U.S. Code. 
19
 35 USC § 154. 
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1.3.1.2. “Infringement” During the Patent Application Process 
Title 35, Section 271 of the United States Code defines infringement of a patent as follows: 
(a) [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, uses, offers 
to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent. 
(b) [w]hoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. 
(c) [w]hoever offers to sell or sells within the United States, or imports into the United 
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination, or composition, or a 
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of 
the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an 
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for 
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.20  
Patent applicants have limited recourse against those guilty of “infringing” conduct committed 
while the patent is pending but prior to its issuance. This is the case even if the “infringer” is on 
actual notice of the pending patent claim. “If the would-be infringer stops all activities once the 
patent issues, then the infringer would seem to be free from any liability, at least from patent 
theories. If the would-be infringer intends to continue his acts after the patent issues, then the 
knowing infringer may temper his pre-issuance actions in an effort to avoid potentially enhanced 
damages from post-issuance infringement.”21   
Addressing this issue in Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Industrial Products, Inc., Chief Judge 
Markey considered it:  
obvious that a party cannot be held liable for ‘infringement’, and thus not for ‘willful’ in-
fringement, of a nonexistent patent, i.e., no damages are payable on products manufactured 
and sold before the patent issued. Whether an act is ‘willful’ is by definition a question of 
the actor’s intent, the answer to which must be inferred from all the circumstances. Hence a 
party cannot be found to have ‘willfully’ infringed a patent of which the party had no 
knowledge. Nor is there a universal rule that to avoid willfulness one must cease manufac-
ture of a product immediately upon learning of a patent, or upon receipt of a patentee’s 
charge of infringement, or upon the filing of suit.22 
1.3.1.3. Nature of Patent Rights 
The essence of patent rights resides in the ability of the owner to exclude others from making, 
using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the patented invention into the United States. This 
right to exclude others is separate and distinct from the right of a patent owner to make, use, sell, 
                                                 
20
 35 USC § 271 (Effective December 8, 2003). 
21
 Shimokaji, M. (1997), Inducement and Contributory Infringement Theories to Regulate Pre-Patent Issuance Activity, 
http://www.lawtechjournal.com/archives/blt/i2-mas.html. 
22
 Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Products, Inc., 897 F.2d 508 (Fifth Cir. 1990). 
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offer to sell, or import the patented invention. A patent is considered personal property and its 
rights can be sold pursuant to a written license agreement. 
1.3.1.4. First to Invent Versus First to File 
In the United States, ownership of a patent is determined by the “first to invent” rather than the “first to 
file.” According to Title 35, Section 101 of the U.S. Code, “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new 
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.” 
Notably, the United States is one of the few countries in the world to follow the “first to invent” 
rather than the “first to file” rule. 
1.3.1.5. Patents as Property 
The United States Patent Act treats patents as personal property. As such, patent rights can be 
sold pursuant to a written agreement or licensed in a like manner. Licensing is a process by which 
a holder of patent rights (the licensor) grants permission to another party (the licensee) to com-
mercially exploit the patented invention, usually in return for some form of payment or royalty. 
Licenses can be exclusive or nonexclusive. Under an exclusive license, the licensor grants ex-
ploitation rights to the licensee, to the exclusion of others (including the licensor/patent holder). 
In contrast, a nonexclusive license permits multiple licensees, and may allow the licensor/patent 
holder to act as a competing manufacturer. 
1.3.2. Trademarks Overview 
Trademark law governs the use of a word, phrase, symbol, product shape, logo, or device by a 
manufacturer or merchant to identify the source of the goods or services and to distinguish them 
from those made or sold by another.  
Trademarks for goods (or service marks for services) act to (1) identify and distinguish the 
goods (or services) of one company from the goods (or services) of another, and (2) indicate the 
source of the goods (or services), even if that source is unknown. Any of a number of 
symbols or designations can serve as a trademark or service mark, such as words, logos, prod-
uct configurations, and sounds. A color or smell may also be entitled to trademark protection. A 
designation of TM (for trademarks), SM (for services marks), or ® (for registered marks) 
evidences a claim of protection by the owner of the mark. 
In contrast to patents and copyrights, trademarks may be afforded protection both under federal 
law (whether federally registered or not) and state law. The federal statutes governing United 
States trademark law are found in the Lanham Act, Title 15 of the U.S. Code. State statutes and 
common law also provide trademark protection. Among other purposes, state trademark laws 
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are intended to prevent the deceptive and misleading use of marks in commerce and to pro-
tect persons engaged in such commerce against unfair competition. Additionally, certain state 
trademark laws can be used to exclude others from lessening the capacity of a famous mark to 
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of whether there is an absence of compe-
tition or a likelihood of confusion. 
1.3.2.1. Registration Process 
To obtain a federal trademark registration, the trademark owner must file a formal registration 
application, together with specimens showing how the mark is used, and pay the required 
fee. The USPTO examines trademark registration applications through a process similar to that 
used for patent applications. After filing, the trademark application is assigned to a USPTO 
trademark attorney, who evaluates whether the requirements for registering a mark have been met. 
The USPTO attorney examines the registration for specifically enumerated categories of marks 
that cannot be registered (i.e., immoral, deceptive, scandalous, or merely descriptive marks). 
In addition, the USPTO attorney conducts a search of registered marks to determine whether 
prior registered marks exist that are likely to (1) cause confusion, (2) cause mistake, or (3) de-
ceive with respect to the applicant’s trademark. 
After this examination, the USPTO attorney either accepts or rejects the trademark application. If 
the application is accepted, the public is notified in a government publication called the Of-
ficial Gazette, which puts them on constructive notice of the acceptance. This notice is given 
so that members of the public have an opportunity to object to the grant of a registration within 
an opposition proceeding. Assuming the mark is not successfully opposed in such a proceeding, 
a registration ordinarily will issue. Conversely, if the USPTO attorney rejects the application, the 
applicant is afforded an opportunity to challenge that decision. 
The USPTO registration process permits a person to pursue a trademark registration based 
simply on a “bona fide intent to use” a mark in commerce. This process affords an applicant cer-
tain priority rights when it does not currently use a mark but wants to preserve it for future use. 
Among other purposes, a federal trademark registration can be used in a lawsuit as prima-facie 
evidence of the registered mark and of the registrant’s exclusive right to use that mark in 
commerce. However, trademark rights and entitlement to relief for infringement are available 
whether or not a trademark registration is in place. In the absence of a federal registration, the 
trademark owner must prove that the mark is inherently distinctive to be entitled to relief.23 
Provided certain conditions are met, a mark’s registration can become incontestable after a pre-
scribed time period. An incontestable registration generally serves as conclusive evidence of the 
                                                 
23
 A mark that is inherently distinctive is commonly referred to as having acquired secondary meaning. Secondary 
meaning generally refers to a mark that is descriptive of the goods or services and which consumers recognize as 
synonymous with a function, such as IBM for computers and other business machines. 
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validity and registration of the mark, as well as the registrant’s ownership of the mark and exclu-
sive right to use it. 
1.3.2.2. Nature of Trademark Rights 
Trademark rights arise by virtue of use. In general, the first to use a symbol as a mark in com-
merce to distinguish goods or services is entitled to exclude others from making a confusingly 
similar use of the mark in the same area of commerce. However, the failure to continue to use 
a mark appropriately can result in an abandonment of the mark, i.e., a forfeiture of the 
trademark rights. 
1.3.2.3. Trademarks as Property 
The Lanham Act treats trademarks as personal property. As a result, trademark rights can be sold 
along with the goodwill of the business associated with the mark. Trademark rights can also be 
licensed, provided that certain requirements are imposed under the licensee to help preserve the 
“source indicating” nature of the mark.24 
1.3.2.4. Service Marks, Certification Marks, and Collective Marks 
Trademark law also governs service marks, certification marks, and collective marks, which are 
used on services or businesses rather than products. An example of a service mark is 
McDonald’s® for restaurant services. A certification mark refers to any word, name, symbol, de-
vice, or any combination thereof, used, or intended to be used, in commerce with the owner’s 
permission by someone other than its owner, to certify regional or other geographic origin, mate-
rial, mode of manufacture, quality, accuracy, or other characteristics of someone’s goods or ser-
vices, including work or labor performed on the goods or services by members of a union or 
other organization.25   
Collective marks are a trademark or service mark used or intended to be used in commerce, by 
the members of a cooperative, an association, or other collective group or organization, including 
a mark that indicates membership in a union, an association, or other organization.26 
1.3.2.5. Trade Dress 
Trade dress under the Lanham Act refers to the “design and appearance of the product together 
with all the elements making up the overall image that serves to identify the product presented to 
the consumer.”27  The elements in question should serve no purpose other than identification of 
                                                 
24
 See generally Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871-72 (Tenth Cir. 1995). 
25
 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmfaq.htm#DefineCertMark. 
26
 U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/tac/tmfaq.htm#DefineCertMark. 
27
 Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine Made Simple, Inc., LJG Wines, Inc., 320 F.Supp.2d 60 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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the source. In addition, the court will determine whether the purchasing public is likely to con-
fuse the “dress” adopted and used by the alleged infringer.  
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, the operator of a chain of Mexican restaurants sued an op-
erator of a similar chain for trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act. The United States 
Supreme Court held that “. . . trade dress which is inherently distinctive is protectable under [the] 
Lanham Act without showing that it has acquired secondary meaning.”28 Generally, a “likelihood 
of confusion” must be proven in order to establish a trade dress infringement claim; it is not suf-
ficient for confusion to be merely possible. 
1.3.2.6. Enforcement of Trademark Rights 
Whether a trademark owner sues for infringement under a trademark registration, state statute, 
or common law, the test for infringement will ordinarily turn on the likelihood of confusion. That 
is, does the use of the mark by the alleged infringer result in a likelihood of confusion as to ori-
gin, sponsorship, or approval of the subject goods or services in question? 
A mark is infringed under United States trademark law when another person uses the mark in a 
manner that causes confusion as to the source or sponsorship of the goods or services involved. 
The confusion can arise from the similarity in the nature of the products or services or other fac-
tors that cause the infringer’s product or service to be associated, affiliated, connected, approved, 
authorized, or sponsored by the mark owner.  
If a mark is protected only under common law (i.e., no trademark registration), different parties 
can permissibly use the same mark if there is no geographic overlap in their use of such mark. 
Federally registered marks have a nationwide geographic scope and cannot be used by multiple 
parties without a valid license. 
With respect to damages, Section 1117 of the Lanham Act 29 states that a plaintiff shall be able  
to recover (1) defendant’s profits, (2) any damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the 
costs of the action. The court shall assess such profits and damages or cause the same to be 
assessed under its direction. In assessing profits, the plaintiff shall be required to prove de-
fendant’s sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction claimed. In as-
sessing damages, the court may enter judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, 
for any sum above the amount found as actual damages, not exceeding three times such 
amount. If the court shall find that the amount of the recovery based on profits is either in-
adequate or excessive the court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the 
court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the case. Such sum in either of 
the above circumstances shall constitute compensation and not a penalty. The court in ex-
ceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.30 
                                                 
28
 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992). 
29
 Trademark damages were reclassified from Title 17 to Title 15 of the U.S. Code in 2003. 
30
 15 USC § 1117. 
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Although the Lanham Act gives trademark owners the right to recover the defendant’s profits as 
well as the owner’s actual damages, the owner’s recovery is “subject to the principles of eq-
uity.”31  In essence, this means that actual damage and disgorgement awards in a single case may 
not be duplicative. Further, if a new claimant seeks an award of damages against an infringing 
defendant based on the same act or course of conduct that gave rise to an earlier damage award 
against the same defendant, the court will address equitable considerations.  
Trademarks may be subject to reverse confusion.32 This type of confusion occurs when consum-
ers are likely to mistakenly believe, usually as a result of widespread advertising or promotion by 
the infringer, that the trademarked products are actually those of the infringer.33 
A suit for trademark dilution may be available under federal or state law. Dilution lawsuits of-
ten are between two parties that do not compete with each other. Nevertheless, the accused 
party is alleged to have (1) disparaged the mark, and/or (2) diminished the value of the mark. 
Remedies for state trademark dilution are similar to remedies under the Lanham Act for regis-
tered trademark infringement (15 USC § 1114) and unfair competition (15 USC §1125(a)). The 
incidence of dilution suits has increased with the advent of disputes over Internet domain names. 
1.3.3. Copyright Overview 
The United States Copyright Act protects original works of authorship fixed in any tangible me-
dium of expression (subject to certain restrictions related to works for hire), including the follow-
ing works: 
1. Literary works. 
2. Musical works, including any accompanying words. 
3. Dramatic works, including any accompanying music. 
4. Pantomimes and choreographic works. 
5. Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works. 
6. Motion pictures and other audio/visual works. 
                                                 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 “Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any 
word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading 
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which— (a) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause 
mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the 
origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person, or (b) in 
commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or 
her or another person’s goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil action by any person who be-
lieves that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.” 15 USC § 1125. 
33
 Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition. Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., p. 320, 2004. 
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7. Software programs and applications. 
8. Sound recordings. 
9. Architectural works. 
Notice of copyright is shown as either (1) the symbol ©, or the words Copyright or Copr.; (2) 
the year of first publication; and (3) the name of the owner. Appending the notice of copyright is 
no longer legally required in order to establish copyright protection in a work. However, if a no-
tice of copyright is present, it may afford certain benefits to the copyright owner, independent of 
the obvious deterrent effect on potential infringement. 
1.3.3.1. The Registration Process 
The law of copyright is exclusively federal. The United States Copyright Office handles the registration 
of copyrights in this country. However, a copyright may exist automatically at the time of its creation.  
An applicant for copyright registration must complete an application, submit one or more 
copies of the work, and pay a fee. The Copyright Office examines the application to deter-
mine whether (1) the subject matter can be copyrighted, and (2) all legal and formal require-
ments for a copyright have been met. 
Demonstration of originality is essential for copyright registration. For example, in Feist Pub-
lications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., the United States Supreme Court ruled that an alpha-
betical listing of names and addresses in a white pages telephone directory did not evidence 
the requisite degree of creativity required for originality and was not copyrightable. The Court held 
that (1) the names, towns, and telephone numbers of the utility’s subscribers were not copyright-
able facts, and (2) these bits of information had not been selected, coordinated, or arranged in an 
original way sufficient to meet the constitutional or statutory requirements for copyright protection.34 
Assuming all registration requirements are met, the Copyright Office will ordinarily issue a for-
mal certificate of copyright registration. The certificate is effective as of the date that the Copy-
right Office received all items required for registration. The certificate of registration, if is-
sued within five years of the first publication of the work, constitutes prima-facie evidence of 
the copyright’s validity and of the facts stated in the certificate.  
In the event that the Copyright Office denies an application for registration, it affords the appli-
cant an opportunity to respond. 
                                                 
34
 Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991). 
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1.3.3.2. Nature of Rights From Copyrights 
Subject to certain limitations, Section 106 of the Copyright Act enumerates the following six 
categories of exclusive rights conferred upon copyright owners: 
1. To reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords. 
2. To prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work. 
3. To distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or other 
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending. 
4. In the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works; pantomimes; and motion 
pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly. 
5. In the case of literary, musical, dramatic and choreographic works; pantomimes; and picto-
rial, graphic or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly. 
6. In the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digi-
tal audio transmission. 
The bundle of rights granted a copyright owner does not include the right to exclude any and all 
kinds of copying. For instance, copying is legally permissible to the extent that the subject matter 
copied is not “fixed in a tangible medium of expression,” or if the portion copied does not sat-
isfy the originality requirement.35 In addition, the Copyright Act does not protect “any idea, 
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of 
the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.”36  
Among the limitations on the copyright owner’s exclusive rights is the doctrine of “fair use” 
codified in Title 17, Section 107 of the U.S. Code. Under the fair use doctrine, copying for 
“purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching . . . scholarship, or research”37 
may not constitute infringement, based upon an analysis of factors including: 
1. The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit educational purposes. 
2. The nature of the copyrighted work. 
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole. 
4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 
                                                 
35
 17 USC § 102. 
36
 Ibid. 
37
 17 USC § 107. 
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1.3.3.3. Ownership and Works for Hire 
As patent rights vest in the inventor, the ownership of a copyright typically vests in the author 
of a work. Under the “work made for hire” doctrine, the author may be someone other than the 
person who actually performed the physical act of creating the work. The Copyright Act pro-
vides that this doctrine can apply in (1) employer-employee relationships (for example, if an 
employee creates a work within the scope of employment, the employer is the author), and (2) if 
works are commissioned. If the parties agree in writing that the work is a “work for hire,” the 
employer or commissioning party owns the copyright.38 
The Copyright Act treats copyrighted works as personal property. As a result, copyrights are 
transferable, in whole or in part, by written agreement. Rights under a copyright can be trans-
ferred under exclusive and nonexclusive licenses. 
1.3.3.4. Enforcement of Copyrights 
The violation of any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner under the Copyright Act can 
result in an action for copyright infringement. Proving infringement requires a demonstration 
that the infringer copied original elements of the copyrighted work, and copying can be proved 
by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Under the latter approach, the copyright owner must 
prove that (1) the defendant had access to the copyrighted work (such as if the accused in-
fringer had an opportunity to review the copyrighted work), and (2) the alleged infringing 
work is substantially similar to the copyrighted work. 
Section 504 of Title 17 to the U.S. Code is the primary copyright damage provision in the Copy-
right Act. Subsection (a) of Section 504 provides that “an infringer of copyright is liable for ei-
ther (1) the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer, as 
provided by subsection (b); or (2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c).”39 Subsec-
tion (b) of Section 504 states that the copyright owner, when disgorging the infringer’s profits, 
must present proof of the infringer’s gross revenue; the infringer, however, is required to prove 
deductible expenses and elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work. 
Subsection (c) of Section 504 states that the statutory amount of damages must be:  
in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just . . . . In a 
case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that in-
fringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award of 
statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000. In a case where the infringer sustains 
the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no rea-
                                                 
38
 Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition. Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co.,  
p. 1637, 2004. 
39
 17 USC § 504. 
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son to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its 
discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200.40   
Note, however, that the infringer’s recovery cannot be duplicative. For example, the copyright 
owner may not recover both the profits the infringer made and the profits that the copyright 
owner would have made on the same sales. 
Summing up, Section 504 of Title 17 authorizes courts to grant copyright owners actual damages 
suffered as a result of the infringement. In addition, any profits of the infringer attributable to the 
infringement are granted to the copyright owner in order to remedy the damage caused by the in-
fringement, as long as these damages are not duplicative. Should the copyright owner be un-
able to prove actual damages or the defendant’s profits, Section 504 alternatively grants 
the copyright owner the right to elect (at any time before final judgment is rendered) to recover 
an award of statutory damages instead of actual damages and profits. 
As under patent law, various remedies beyond money damages are available to a copyright 
owner who prevails in an infringement action. These include injunctive relief under Title 17, 
Section 502, and impoundment and destruction of the subject infringing matter under Section 
503. As discussed above, statutory damages may also be available under Section 504. 
1.3.4. Trade Secrets Overview 
In most states, a trade secret consists of a formula, pattern, physical device, idea, process, or 
compilation of information that (1) provides the owner of the information with a competitive ad-
vantage in the marketplace, and (2) is treated in a way that can reasonably be expected to prevent 
the public or competitors from learning about it, absent improper acquisition or theft.41 Trade se-
cret law can protect valuable technical information, such as the formula for Coca-Cola, that 
would otherwise be in the public domain. 
In 1979, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws promulgated the 
highly influential Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which was amended in 1985. This 
Act was intended to codify the basic principles of common law trade secret protection. Al-
though the definition of a trade secret varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, the majority have 
adopted a hybrid of the following definition in the UTSA: 
“Trade secret” means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, de-
vice, method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper 
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) 
is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.42 
                                                 
40
 17 USC § 504. 
41
 Uniform Trade Secrets Act with 1985 Amendments, p. 9. 
42
 Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1 (4). 
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The UTSA has been enacted into law in a majority of states. In the states that have not 
adopted the UTSA, such as New York and Texas, the Restatement of Torts and/or Restatement 
of Unfair Competition remain influential. In general, the legal principles articulated in the 
Restatements are mirrored by the UTSA. 
Sections 2 and 3 of the UTSA address damages. Section 2(a) states “[u]pon application to the 
court, an injunction shall be terminated when the trade secret has ceased to exist, but the injunc-
tion may be continued for an additional reasonable period of time in order to eliminate commer-
cial advantage that otherwise would be derived from the misappropriation.”43 Section 3(a), gov-
erning the award of damages for misappropriation of a trade secret, states that: 
[e]xcept to the extent that a material and prejudicial change of position prior to acquiring 
knowledge or reason to know of misappropriation renders a monetary recovery inequitable, a 
complainant is entitled to recover damages for misappropriation. Damages can include 
both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misap-
propriation that is not taken into account in computing actual loss. In lieu of damages meas-
ured by any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be measured by 
imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator’s unauthorized disclo-
sure or use of a trade secret.44   
In most states, the essential elements of a claim alleging trade secret misappropriation are the fol-
lowing: 
1. A trade secret. 
2. Acquisition of the trade secret in confidence. 
3. The unauthorized use of the trade secret. 
In 1995, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmon, reinvigorated the 
“inevitable disclosure” doctrine applicable to trade secrets. Under this doctrine, the owner of the 
trade secret can prove trade secret misappropriation by demonstrating that the employee’s new 
employment will inevitably lead them to divulge the secret, whether consciously or not, because 
of the type of work in which the employee will be involved with the new employer.45 One of the 
complexities of the inevitable disclosure doctrine lies in differentiating between a protected trade 
secret, on the one hand, and the ex-employee’s knowledge and skills retained in their memory, 
on the other. 
“[I]n the case of a trade secret[,] appropriation is to be determined by reference to the analogous 
line of cases involving patent infringement, just as patent infringement cases are used by analogy 
to determine the damages for copyright infringement. Damages are allowed in trade secret cases, 
not upon the theory of the taking of property, but rather upon the theory of a breach of a confi-
                                                 
43
 Uniform Trade Secrets Act with 1985 Amendments, p. 8. 
44
 Uniform Trade Secrets Act with 1985 Amendments, p. 11. 
45
 PepsiCo, Inc. v. William E. Redmond, Jr., 1996 WL 3965 (N.D. Ill. 1996) 
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dential relationship.”46 “However, it often happens that defendants have utilized protected tech-
nology to their advantage with no obvious effect on the plaintiff, except for the relative differ-
ences in their competitive position.”47 Therefore, “[c]omputing damages in a trade secrets case is 
not cut and dry.”48   
For a trade secret misappropriation claim to prevail, the trade secret needs to contain elements 
that are unique and potentially unknown. Without this showing, the claim will be dismissed. For 
example, in Midgard Corp. v. Todd, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was: 
hard-pressed to understand what this secret information is. Midgard claims only generally 
that the secret is ‘the compilation of information as to [its] customers, suppliers, pricing and 
practices.’ As the bankruptcy court found, Midgard made no effort to keep any of this in-
formation confidential or to limit Todd’s use of the information. Midgard admitted it told 
hundreds of people about its exclusivity agreement with its primary or sole customer, 
Medite. There is no indication that the names of Midgard’s scrap suppliers were not easily 
ascertainable by observation or by reference to directories. Midgard complains that Todd 
bought the same piece of wood-grinding equipment that it was planning to buy, but this was 
an off-the-shelf machine advertised in trade publications . . . We see no error in the bank-
ruptcy court’s finding that Midgard did not prove the existence of a trade secret.49 
Recent case law has expanded the protection of trade secrets under the United States Computer 
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA). In Shurgard v. Safeguard, an employer alleged that former em-
ployees had the employer’s trade secrets stored on their computers and had given them to a com-
petitor. The court held that (1) for purposes of stating a claim under the CFAA, the former em-
ployees had lost access to their computers when they allegedly became agents of the competitor; 
(2) the CFAA was not limited to situations in which the national economy was affected; (3) the 
fraud provision of the CFAA did not require showing of common law fraud elements; (4) the 
provision penalizing infliction of damage on protected computers was not limited to conduct of 
outsiders; and (5) the damage claim was stated, even though appropriation did not affect integrity 
of secrets within employers’ computers.50 
Trade secrets also include customer lists. For example, in Ed Nowogroski Insurance, Inc. v. 
Rucker, the Washington State Superior Court ruled that employees had misappropriated em-
ployer’s trade secrets by retaining and using client lists and other documents. The court awarded 
damages, except withheld relief for one employee’s solicitation of clients based on the misap-
propriation of memorized information.51 On appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington, address-
                                                 
46
 International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696, 699 (Third Cir. 1957). 
47
 Warden, D., Bratic, W., and Eggleston, C. (September 2000). Trade Secrets and Patents: Comparison and Contrasts 
in Royalty Determination, les Nouvelles, p. 143. 
48
 American Sales Corp. v. Adventure Travel, Inc., 862 F.Supp. 1476 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
49
 Midgard Corp. v. Todd, 107 F.3d 880 (Tenth Cir. 1997) unpublished opinion. 
50
 Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, 119 F.Supp.2d 1121 (W.D.Wash. 2000). 
51
 Ed Nowogroski Insurance, Inc. v. Rucker, 137 Wash.2d 427, 971 P.2d 936 (Wash. 1999). 
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ing the issue of first impression, “held that trade secret protection does not depend on whether a 
customer list is taken in written form or memorized.”52  
As can be seen from this discussion, the protection of trade secrets arises under a complex body 
of case law that makes the calculation of damages for their theft a challenge. As a result, an ex-
pert will benefit from being both flexible and analytic in developing an approach for measuring 
damages in trade secret cases. 
1.3.5. Jurisdiction Summary 
The table below summarizes the jurisdictions in which civil actions for intellectual property dis-
putes can be brought in the United States court system. Note that a federal court’s diversity juris-
diction may provide for a federal forum even for disputes that are based exclusively on state law. 
 
 Patent Trademark Copyright Trade Secret 
 Utility 
Patent 
Plant  
Patent 
Design 
Patent 
   
State Court    X  X 
Federal Court (Appeal via Local 
Circuits to U.S. Supreme Court)    X X X 
Federal Court (Appeal via 
Federal Circuit to United States 
Supreme Court) 
X X X    
 
                                                 
52
 Ibid. 
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2. CALCULATING INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Many intellectual property disputes arise from allegations that one party infringed another 
party’s intellectual property rights. As such, the analyst is often confronted with the issue of as-
sessing lost profits and/or economic damages resulting from the alleged infringement. There are 
significant differences between valuing intellectual property for transaction purposes, on the one 
hand, and estimating damages resulting from the infringement or misappropriation of intellectual 
property, on the other.  
For example, the transaction analyst often assesses the value of the intellectual property for its 
potential future benefits and gains or for purchase price allocation purposes. In this context, the 
analyst may focus his or her analysis on (1) consumer demand for the product, and/or (2) the 
likelihood that an alternative substitute product will emerge. In contrast, the orientation of the 
damages expert in the context of litigation is more retrospective than prospective in nature. 
Damage experts often find themselves analyzing historical data for purposes of ascertaining what 
would have transpired “but for” the alleged infringement, with an assumption that the future 
sales of an infringing product will be enjoined at trial. There are exceptions to this assumption, 
however, such as when future sales or pricing will be adversely affected even after the issuance 
of an injunction against continued infringement. 
Taxes, ordinarily a component of a transactional valuation analysis, are not ordinarily addressed 
in calculating damages arising from infringement or misappropriation. In the litigation context, 
damages are normally computed on a pretax basis, because damages from intellectual property 
disputes are taxable as ordinary income under United States law. Exceptions to this rule may 
arise, however, if profits would have been earned in one time period or tax jurisdiction, but are 
shifted to another as a result of the litigation. In such a case, an adjustment to the damage analy-
sis may be necessary to make the injured party whole. The analyst should consult with counsel to 
determine the appropriate tax treatment in the relevant jurisdiction. 
Intellectual property case law is often categorized by the nature of the property in dispute. For 
example, there is a distinct body of case law addressing patents, copyrights, trademarks, and 
trade secrets individually. However, these cases often address principles and/or concepts appli-
cable to all forms of intellectual property. If unique differences exist in the intellectual property 
laws and case history, this Practice Aid will (1) distinguish those differences, and (2) provide 
corresponding case law references.  
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2.2. OVERVIEW OF CALCULATING DAMAGES 
The chart below summarizes the nature of damages available for infringement of each type of in-
tellectual property. 
Availability of Damage Measures in Intellectual Property Disputes 
 
Patent 53 Trademark Copyright Trade Secret 54 
 
Utility  
Patent 
Plant  
Patent 
Design 
 Patent    
Lost Profits X X X X X X 
Price Erosion X X X X X X 
Corrective Advertising    X   
Unjust Enrichment   X X X X 
Reasonable Royalty X X X X X X 
Decrease in Value    X X X 
Statutory55    X X  
2.2.1. Compensatory Damages 
The fundamental purpose of a civil damages remedy is to make the plaintiff whole for its legally 
recognized injuries or losses.56 Compensatory actual damages for intellectual property in-
fringement or misappropriation, accordingly, are intended to compensate the plaintiff for 
economic loss caused by the infringement. Examples of compensatory damages include lost 
profits (i.e., profits lost on sales that would have been made “but for” the infringement) and rea-
sonable royalty (i.e., royalty income that the plaintiff would have earned had it entered into an 
agreement to license the intellectual property in suit to defendant), among other measures.  
2.2.1.1. Market Value Measure 
The market value measure is what courts most often refer to when they use the term general 
damages.57 The market value measure determines the market value of the intellectual property 
                                                 
53
 Statutory damages may be available for patent mismarking. 
54
 Specifics depend on individual state law. 
55
 Statutory damages for trademarks are only available in regards to trademark infringement involving counterfeiting.  
56
 Dobbs, D., Dobbs Law of Remedies: Damages—Equity Restitution, Second ed. 1993, p. 281. 
57
 Ibid., p. 288. 
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“as is” and the market value “as if it were not injured.” The difference between these two values 
is the damage that the defendant’s wrongful act inflicted on the owner of the intellectual property. 
2.2.1.2. Lost Opportunity Measure 
The lost opportunity measure quantifies the decrease in market value or the impact on market 
value that the intellectual property owner is deprived of by reason of the infringement. This lost 
opportunity measure is often referred to by the courts as special or consequential damages.58 
Although the market value measure and the lost opportunity measure may appear similar in na-
ture, they are, in fact, distinct damage measures. The market value measure compensates a plain-
tiff for the diminished value of the intellectual property attributable to a civil wrong. The lost op-
portunity measure, on the other hand, compensates a plaintiff for the loss of income that would 
have been generated from the intellectual property’s use or ownership. A plaintiff is normally per-
mitted to seek one or the other of these two alternative measures of damages, but not both.59 
2.2.2. Unjust Enrichment and Prejudgment Interest 
Unjust enrichment is an alternative damages measure to compensatory damages. Although com-
pensatory damages seek to restore the plaintiff to its financial position absent the defendant’s 
wrongful act, an unjust enrichment award seeks to deprive the defendant of whatever gain or 
benefit was obtained from the wrongful act. In other words, unjust enrichment seeks to take from 
the defendant the fruits of its wrongful act and award them to the plaintiff. 
In his book Dobbs Law of Remedies: Damages—Equity Restitution, Dan Dobbs identifies the fol-
lowing methods for measuring the gain obtained by a defendant for purposes of an unjust en-
richment award: 
1. The increased assets in the hands of the defendant from the receipt of the property; 
2. The market value of services or intangibles provided to the defendant, without regard to 
whether the defendant’s assets were actually increased; that is, the amount which it would 
cost to obtain similar services, whether those services prove to be useful or not; 
3. The use value of any benefits received, as measured by (i) market indicators such as rental 
value or interest or (ii) actual gains to the defendant from using the benefits, such as the 
gains identified in item (5) below; 
4. The gains realized by the defendant upon sale or transfer of the asset received from the 
plaintiff; and 
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 Dobbs, D., Dobbs Law of Remedies: Damages—Equity Restitution, Second ed. 1993, pp. 312-313. 
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5. Collateral or secondary profits earned by the defendant by use of an asset received from the 
plaintiff, or, similarly or comparably, the savings effected by the use of the asset.60 
Unjust enrichment is a damage measure that is frequently employed in intellectual property liti-
gation. For example, the Copyright Act expressly provides for the recovery by the copyright 
owner of “any profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not 
taken into account in computing the actual damages.”61 Provided that an award does not in-
clude a double recovery, a copyright owner may recover both (1) actual damages, and (2) an in-
fringer’s profits. Accordingly, a copyright owner can receive both compensatory and unjust 
enrichment damages as a monetary award. 
With respect to trademarks, the Lanham Act explicitly authorizes a trademark owner to re-
cover both the infringer’s profits and its own damages sustained “subject to the principles of 
equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable . . .”62 Similarly, the UTSA ex-
pressly provides that, in addition to recovering its actual loss, a trade secret owner may recover 
the “unjust enrichment” caused by the misappropriation to the extent the enrichment is not 
taken into account in calculating the owner’s actual loss.63   
Notably, the Copyright Act, the Lanham Act and the UTSA each provide that the intellectual 
property owner shall recover only the net profits of the infringer that are traceable to the in-
fringement. This constraint requires an expert attempting to quantify an appropriate unjust en-
richment award to determine (1) the infringer’s revenues and costs associated with the infringe-
ment, and (2) what portion of the net profits are attributable to the infringement (commonly re-
ferred to as the apportionment problem). These issues often present significant analytical 
challenges to the expert.64   
Prejudgment interest may be awarded in addition to other damages. In Allen Archery, Inc. v. 
Browning Manufacturing Co.,65 the Federal Circuit explained that an award of prejudgment interest 
is necessary to place the patent owner into the same position it would have been but for the in-
fringement. If the court awards prejudgment interest, that interest ordinarily accrues from the date 
that damages began. However, that is not the case for trademarks; the Lanham Act provides that 
“[t]he court in its discretion may award prejudgment interest on relief recovered under this para-
graph, at an annual interest rate established under Section 6621(a)(2) of Title 26, commencing on 
                                                 
60
 Ibid., pp. 571-586. 
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 17 USC § 504 (2)(b). 
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 15 USC § 1125 (c)(1). 
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 Uniform Trade Secrets Act with 1985 Amendments, §3 (a). 
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 The fact that the burden is on the infringer to prove the expenses that should be deductible from gross revenues to 
derive net profits somewhat eases the expert’s apportionment challenge. See Section 2.5.6.2 below. 
65
 Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Manufacturing Co., 898 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
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the date of service of the claimant’s pleading setting forth the claim under this paragraph and end-
ing on the date such recovery is granted, or for such shorter time as the court deems appropriate.”66 
2.2.3. The Infringement Damage Calculation 
In general, if “the record permits the determination of actual damages, namely, the profits the 
patentee lost from the infringement, that determination accurately measures the patentee’s loss. If 
actual damages cannot be ascertained, then a reasonable royalty must be determined.”67 The ex-
pert will ordinarily make certain preliminary findings before determining the most appropriate 
measure of infringement damages. One such finding is the dollar amount of sales. The units sold 
and incremental profits will also need to be determined, because incremental profits are central to 
the damage calculation. These determinations are discussed below in Sections 2.3.2, 2.3.3. and 2.4. 
It appears that a number of courts demand somewhat less precision in the calculation of damages 
in the nonpatent context. For example, once a copyright owner establishes a causal link between 
the alleged infringement and some loss of anticipated revenue, a court may allow estimation as to 
the amount lost within a reasonable range of certainty. Uncertainty as to the precise amount of 
damages does not preclude recovery of damages if the causal relationship and the fact of dam-
ages are established. As neither the Copyright Act nor its legislative history specifically defines 
actual damages, the judicial system enjoys a large degree of latitude in determining actual dam-
ages. Similarly, in trademark litigation, courts typically have “wide discretion in assessing dam-
ages, which may be awarded even where they are not susceptible to precise calculations.”68   
2.3. LOST PROFITS 
Although articulated in various ways, one consistent theme in calculating infringement dam-
ages is the entitlement of the owner to recover lost profits due to the infringer’s conduct. The 
discussion in this section will address lost profits in the context of patents. However, lost prof-
its can be calculated for infringement of copyrights, trademarks, and other forms of intellectual 
property as well.  
Lost profits are calculated based on the profits that the intellectual property owner would have 
made from the sale of the units, “but for” the infringement, even if some of the components of 
the units were not covered by the intellectual property in suit. The measure of lost profit damages 
can be based on a combination of components, such as: 
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 15 USC § 1116 (d)(11). 
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 Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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 Slater, Jr., T.G. (April 19, 2002). Damages in Trademark Cases: Finding Them and Proving Them, Presentation at 
AIPLA Spring Meeting, New York City. 
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1. Lost unit sales. 
2. Lower unit sales prices. 
3. Higher costs (such as increased production and/or marketing costs). 
4. Lost sales on ancillary (convoyed69) products that are typically sold with the infringed product. 
5. Extra expenses, such as trademark advertising expense. 
2.3.1. Availability of Lost Profits 
To be entitled to lost profits, a plaintiff “ . . . must demonstrate that there was reasonable prob-
ability that, but for the infringement, it would have made infringer’s sales.”70  The patent owner 
must offer proof demonstrating, to a reasonable probability, entitlement to lost profits “but for” 
the infringement.71  In Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., the Federal Circuit Court 
stated that once the intellectual property owner establishes the reasonableness of this inference, 
the burden shifts to the infringer to show that the inference is unreasonable for some or all of the 
lost profits.72   
The Panduit73 and two-supplier market test74 are two recognized methods of showing “but for” 
causation. As discussed below, market definition is a critical factor under both tests. 
2.3.1.1. Patent Disputes: The Panduit Test 
The Federal Circuit has made clear that there is no single method by which the patent owner 
must carry its burden of proving lost profits. A leading authority on the measurement of lost 
profits in a patent case is Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc. This case articulated a 
four-factor test that has been accepted by most courts as a useful, but nonexclusive, method for a 
patent holder to prove entitlement to lost profits.75   
Under Panduit, the patent owner must prove each of the following facts to be entitled to lost 
profits: 
1. Demand existed for the infringed product during the period of infringement. 
2. Acceptable non-infringing substitute products were not available to satisfy demand during 
the period of infringement. 
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 See Section 2.3.7 below discussing convoyed sales. 
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 State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1577 (Fed.Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1022 (1990). 
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 King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 952 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rehg. denied, 1165 S. Ct. 1675 (1996). 
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 Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1065 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
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3. The patent owner possessed the manufacturing and marketing capability to have supplied the 
patented product to the customers who bought the infringing product. 
4. The amount of the profit the patent holder would have made. 76 
Historically, if any of the four prongs of the Panduit test was not proven, the patent holder was 
unable to recover lost profits. Subsequent cases have refined and in some respects relaxed these 
requirements. For instance, case law has refined the first Panduit factor to require demand for 
the patented features rather than just the product. With respect to the second Panduit factor, a 
patent holder need not negate each and every possibility that the purchaser would not have pur-
chased a product other than its own, absent the infringement. Rather, the patent holder need only 
show that there was a “reasonable probability” that the sales would have been made by it “but 
for” the infringement. If the patent holder establishes the reasonableness of this inference by sat-
isfying all four prongs of the Panduit test, the burden of proving entitlement to lost profits due to 
the infringing sales has been sustained.77 Each of the four Panduit factors is discussed in the sec-
tions below. 
2.3.1.1.1. Demand Existed for the Infringed Product.  If both the patent holder and the infringer 
have made sales of the product on a regular basis to informed customers, then demonstrating 
demand may be straightforward.78 To show that demand exists for the patented product or fea-
ture of the product, the patent holder should attempt to establish a link between the patented fea-
ture and the commercial success of the product.  
For example, in Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug, Co.,79 the court observed that “the pat-
ented control features were advertised by Champion and while Champion has shown that paint-
ing systems could be made and sold without the patented features, the patented control system 
was obviously important enough to keep for 15 years on all of its short stroke reciprocating 
painting systems. If there was no demand for the patented system, Champion would not have run 
the risk of infringement.”80 The court also found that “[t]he substantial number of sales of in-
fringing products containing patented features was compelling evidence of the demand for the 
product”81 for the purpose of determining lost profits.  
Analyses that may assist in establishing the commercial success of the patented feature include:  
1. Showing the levels and growth of sales of the patented product for both the patent holder and 
the infringer. 
2. Mapping the variations between the sales of the patented product and its predecessor product. 
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3. Reviewing the infringer’s business plans and product literature, which may speak to the im-
portance of the patented feature. 
4. Demonstrating the infringer’s sales prior and subsequent to infringement. 
5. Showing the length of time the infringer has been infringing the patent. 
In response to a patent holder’s proof of demand for the patented product or feature, an infringer 
may claim that its entry into the market expanded that market beyond what it would have been 
absent the infringer’s entry. Alternatively, if the infringer is able to show that (1) there is not de-
mand for the patented feature, or (2) consumers who purchased the infringing product were ei-
ther unaware of the patented feature or that the patented feature was not a material part of their 
buying decision,82 then the patent holder will have a challenge meeting the first prong of the 
Panduit test.  
2.3.1.1.2. Acceptable Non-Infringing Substitutes.  A heavily litigated question is whether accept-
able, non-infringing substitutes for the patented invention existed during the infringement period 
(i.e., the second Panduit factor). “The underlying rationale for imposing this requirement is that if 
acceptable noninfringing substitutes existed, consumers may have purchased the substitutes, rather 
than the patent owner’s product, even if the infringer had not been in the marketplace.”83 
Addressing this factor in Grain Processing Corporation v. American Maize-Products Company, 
the court ruled that “[i]n reconstructing the market to determine what patentee would have made 
if infringement had not occurred, for purpose of claim of lost profits, patentee must project eco-
nomic results that did not occur, and, to prevent the hypothetical from lapsing into pure specula-
tion, there must be sound economic proof of the nature of the market and likely outcomes with 
infringement factored out of the economic picture.”84 
The patent holder—attempting to prove that there are no or few acceptable non-infringing substi-
tutes under the second Panduit factor––tends to have a narrow interpretation of what a consumer 
finds to be an acceptable alternative. In particular, the patent holder may attempt to show that 
any alternatives in the marketplace are truly inferior and do not have the distinct features and 
benefits of the product with the patented feature. Conversely, the alleged infringer tends to 
have a more expansive view of the market. For example, the alleged infringer may attempt to 
prove that there are many acceptable alternatives in the market, making it impossible to 
demonstrate with any reasonable degree of certainty that the patent holder would have sold 
additional units if the infringer was absent from such market. 
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2.3.1.1.2.1. Market Share Approach.  The second prong of the Panduit test requires proof 
that acceptable non-infringing substitute products were not available to satisfy demand during 
the period of infringement. Early interpretations of this prong required the patent holder to prove 
that there was a two-supplier market—itself and the infringer—and that a customer would either 
have purchased the patent holder’s product or the infringing product. If this burden was carried 
by the patent holder, customers would, by definition, have purchased the patent holder’s product 
absent the infringement.  
More recently, the courts have ruled that if multiple competitors exist in the marketplace, they may 
apply a percentage of market share approach in the context of the second Panduit factor. For ex-
ample, in State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., the Federal Circuit allowed the patent owner to 
estimate sales that would have been made in the “but for” world by nonparty competitors on the 
basis of their proportionate market share of infringing sales. Under this approach, awarding lost 
profits based on market share is appropriate, even if acceptable non-infringing alternatives exist, if 
the patent owner is able to (1) demonstrate an established market share, and (2) meet its burden 
under the other three Panduit factors. In this regard, the Federal Circuit stated: 
In the two-supplier market, it is reasonable to assume, provided the patent owner has the 
manufacturing and marketing capabilities, that it would have made the infringer’s sales. In 
these instances, the Panduit test is usually straightforward and dispositive. (“[w]here a pat-
ent owner maintains that it lost sales equal in quantity to the infringing sales, our precedent 
has approved generally the [Panduit test] . . .”) 
Here we have multiple competitors and the patent owner contends that all the competitors 
infringed or sold a far less preferable alternative—fiberglass. The district court made the ab-
sence of acceptable substitutes, Panduit item (2), a neutral factor by crediting all the other 
competitors with their market shares as State requested. If the court is correct in its finding 
that the other competitors were likely infringers of one or the other of State’s patents, State 
would have been entitled to their shares of the market on top of its own, and a correspond-
ingly greater share of Mor-Flo’s sales. If it is wrong in whole or in part, State would have 
been entitled to its current share or to a lesser increase in share.85 
The patent holder in State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., was allowed to recover lost profits 
to the extent of its 40 percent national market share.86 Additionally, the Federal Circuit deter-
mined that the lower court did not err in its determination of a reasonable royalty, which applied 
to the remaining 60 percent of infringing sales.87   
In performing a market share analysis, the expert may consider recasting the market without the 
infringing product’s sales, as depicted in the following pie charts.  
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25%
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With the market defined as including the defendant’s infringing sales, the plaintiff’s market share 
is 50 percent (left pie chart). With the infringing sales excluded from the market, plaintiff’s mar-
ket share is 67 percent (right pie chart).  
The plaintiff’s ability to satisfy the second Panduit factor often hinges on (1) the interpretation of 
the relevant market, and (2) what the consumer was looking for when purchasing the infringing 
item. Although the relevant market might be argued as encompassing nearly all competing sub-
stitute products, the Federal Circuit has narrowed the scope of the patent holder’s burden by rul-
ing that substitute products which incorporate some, but not all, of the elements of the patented 
invention do not necessarily constitute an acceptable substitute. Specifically, in Standard Ha-
vens Products, Inc, v. Gencor Industries, Inc, the Federal Circuit ruled that  
. . . the mere existence of a competing device does not necessarily make that device an ac-
ceptable substitute. A product on the market which lacks the advantages of the patented 
product can hardly be termed a substitute acceptable to the customer who wants those ad-
vantages. Accordingly, if purchasers are motivated to purchase because of particular fea-
tures available only from the patented product, products without such features—even if oth-
erwise competing in the market place—would not be acceptable noninfringing substitutes.88   
The relevant market does include other devices or substitutes similar in physical and functional 
characteristics to the patented invention.89 It excludes, however, alternatives “with disparately 
different prices or significantly different characteristics.”90 Once the market is defined, it gener-
ally becomes an easier task to determine how many suppliers operate in the defined relevant 
market. Market supplier inquiry focuses on the number of companies involved in the supply 
market, not the number of alternatives in the relevant market. 
Market share was further addressed in BIC Leisure Products, Inc. v. Windsurfing International, 
Inc. On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected the trial court’s award of ‘lost profits’ because it found 
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that “[a]ssuming BIC [Leisure] had not been in the market, Windsurfing did not show that BIC 
[Leisure]’s customers would have purchased sailboards from Windsurfing and other manufacturers 
in proportion to their market shares.”91 The Federal Circuit found that the types and prices of 
boards sold by the plaintiff and defendant were different and would be purchased by distinct cus-
tomers. In other words, absent infringement, purchasers of the infringing product would not pur-
chase products from the patent holder, even in proportion to the patent holder’s market share.  
2.3.1.1.2.2. Available and Substitute.  An accused infringer’s ability to produce an accept-
able non-infringing substitute during the damages period may also defeat the patent holder’s re-
covery of lost profits. The infringer may attempt to show that it would have consummated 
some or all of the infringing product sales by selling another available, non-infringing substitute 
in the relevant market. In other words, customers would have selected the infringer’s available, 
non-infringing alternative over the patented invention in the absence of infringement.  
In Grain Processing Corp. v. American Maize Products Co., the Federal Circuit held that if a 
patent holder offers proof of sales it would have made “but for” the infringement, “an accurate 
reconstruction of the hypothetical ‘but for’ market takes into account any alternatives available 
to the infringer.”92 The Federal Circuit explained that a product or process may qualify as an ac-
ceptable non-infringing substitute for purposes of defeating a lost profits claim, even if it was not 
“on the market” or “for sale” during the period of the infringement.93 In that case, the accused in-
fringer has the burden of showing that the alleged alternative would have been available during 
the damage period. 
The defendant in the Grain Processing case supported its claim that its non-infringing process would 
have been available during the infringement period with specific proof that it had “the necessary 
equipment, know-how, and experience”94 during such period to implement the non-infringing proc-
ess. The alleged infringer was also able to demonstrate that its non-infringing process created a prod-
uct acceptable to customers, based in part on market data obtained after converting to the non-
infringing process, but prior to the damages portion of the trial.95 Notably, neither party to this dispute 
had contended that the alternative process infringed the patent or that the alternative was not accept-
able to customers. In light of Grain Processing, defendants may attempt to make arguments concern-
ing “available alternatives” that may be less “available” than the option in that case.  
In Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., the Federal Circuit overruled the lower court’s grant of 
summary judgment with regards to lost profits. In overruling the lower court, the Federal Circuit 
stated that  “[t]he record shows that Lextron did not have the necessary equipment, know-how, 
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and experience to make the Type 5 machine at the time of the infringement . . . [and] [t]he effects 
of the changes also were not well known or readily available.” 96 
Acceptable non-infringing substitutes may also use the design-around concept. The design-
around concept refers to “mak[ing] something that performs the same function or has the same 
physical properties as [a patented product or process] but in a way different enough from the 
original that it does not infringe the patent.”97 The design-around alternative should provide the 
same or comparable utility without infringing the patent. 
2.3.1.1.3. Manufacturing and Marketing Capability to Exploit Demand.  Manufacturing and mar-
keting capacity and capability (i.e., the third Panduit factor) requires the patent holder to prove that 
the infringed sales could have been made by the patent holder within the relevant time period. This 
factor may be proven in a variety of ways. For example, the patent holder may demonstrate manufac-
turing capacity by showing that its facilities were capable (or could have been made capable of) pro-
ducing the number of patented inventions demanded,98 or that the manufacturing could have been 
subcontracted to another manufacturing facility.99 The patent owner typically will attempt to demon-
strate the financial capacity and management strength necessary to produce the additional units.  
The Federal Circuit has stated that “[t]he demand which a patentee must have the capacity to 
meet is measured by the total sales, by the patentee and the infringer, of the patented product.”100 
The following factors may assist in determining capacity to meet such demand: 
1. The relative number of lost units compared to the historic sales of the patent holder. The lar-
ger the volume of lost sales claimed by the patent holder compared to the historic sales vol-
ume, the more difficult it may be to demonstrate capacity. 
2. The size and effectiveness of the sales and distribution network that the patent holder has in 
place compared with what he would need in order to make the lost sales volume. 
3. Channels of distribution for the actual historic sales may differ from those channels where the 
infringer made the infringing sales. The patent holder may need to demonstrate that he had 
the ability to make sales through these alternate channels of distribution in order to prove 
marketing capacity. 
4. It may have been necessary for the patent holder to increase production capacity. The patent 
holder would need to demonstrate the ability (financial and technical) to increase production 
within the required time period. In addition, it may be necessary to adjust the calculation of 
the incremental profit margin to reflect the additional investment by the patent holder in in-
creased capacity.  
                                                 
96
 Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
97
 Black’s Law Dictionary, Eighth Edition. Bryan A. Garner, Editor in Chief. West Publishing Co., St. Paul, MN, p. 478, 
2004. 
98
 Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 616 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
99
 Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549, 554 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
100
 Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820, 825 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
2. Calculating Infringement Damages 
 31
5. In certain industry sectors, such as pharmaceuticals, increasing production capacity requires 
certification and approval from government agencies such as the Food and Drug Administra-
tion. These approvals may increase the cost or time required before the patent holder can in-
crease production. 
6. Analysis of the cost and availability of certain key raw materials may be necessary in order to 
demonstrate that the patent holder had the ability to manufacture the lost sales that are being 
claimed in the lost-profit calculation.101 
The patent holder may be able to prove manufacturing capacity by demonstrating that sufficient 
capacity existed, and/or could have been contracted for, to manufacture the additional units that 
were infringed. The latter analysis would require the expert to quantify the costs of contract 
manufacturing of the patented product. Alternatively, the patent holder can demonstrate manu-
facturing capacity by showing that it was feasible to expand its existing production facilities to 
meet the growing demand. However, this approach will often be found unfeasible when expan-
sion would require closing down the production of a more profitable product.102 With respect to 
marketing capacity, the patent holder should attempt to demonstrate its ability to reach the mar-
ketplace in question, from a geographic and/or support perspective. 
2.3.1.1.4. Quantifying Lost Profits.  Lost profits do not have to be calculated with absolute pre-
cision, but rather with reasonable probability.103 In other words, lost profits are neither un-
founded speculation, nor complete precision, but rather an estimate. Since “ . . . determination of 
a damage award is not an exact science[,] [t]he trial court must best approximate the amount to 
which the patent owner is entitled.”104 “When the amount of damages is not ascertainable with 
precision, reasonable doubt is appropriately resolved against the infringer.”105   
Typically, a patent holder may recover lost incremental profits, equal to the difference between 
(1) gross revenues resulting from regaining the sales lost due to infringement, and (2) the incre-
mental cost of making those sales. This measure of profit loss is appropriate when the patentee’s 
fixed costs do not rise, or only slightly increase, relative to the increases in production. The Fed-
eral Circuit addressed this damage measure in Paper Converting Machinery Co. v. Magna-
Graphics Corp., acknowledging that:  
[t]he incremental income approach to the computation of lost profits is well established in 
the law relating to patent damages. The approach recognizes that it does not cost as much to 
produce unit N+1 if the first N (or fewer) units produced already have paid the fixed costs. 
                                                 
101
 Parr, R. L. Intellectual Property Infringement Damages: a Litigation Support Handbook, Second ed. New York: 
John Wiley & Sons, pp. 64-65, 1999. 
102
 Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1511 (D. Mass. 1990), typographical errors to opinion 
amended by 17 U.S.P.2d 1711 (D. Mass. 1991). 
103
 Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 616 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
104
 King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp.,  767 F.2d 853, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 
105
 Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1987). 
Calculating Intellectual Property Infringement Damages 
 32 
Thus fixed costs—those costs which do not vary with increases in production, such as man-
agement salaries, property taxes, and insurance—are excluded when determining profits.106 
“Incremental costs are distinct from marginal costs in that marginal costs include only those 
costs that vary when producing one more unit, whereas incremental costs include any costs that 
increase as production expands over a relevant range . . .”107 The incremental profit margin is 
typically defined as the profit left after the deduction of those costs necessary to make and sell 
the additional units within a relevant incremental range. For example, 5,000 products may be 
produced at a certain level of incremental cost, but if a quantity greater than 5,000 is produced, 
the incremental costs may be reduced. The cost reduction may arise, for example, from the pro-
ducer’s ability to obtain volume discounts for purchasing additional materials. The incremental 
profit margin may be expressed as a percentage of the unit price of the product.  
Conceptually, lost profits can be separated into two parts, namely (1) the “but for” lost sales or 
revenues, and (2) the incremental profit margin on those “but for” sales. The courts have often 
followed the recommendations of accounting or economic experts in this area. For example, in 
Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., the Federal Circuit awarded the patent holder incremental 
profits based on the following calculation:  
1. Start with revenue derived from sales of the patented product and subtract the direct costs of 
material, labor, commissions, and freight for these sales.  
2. Divide this difference by the number of units sold by the patent holder, yielding the incre-
mental profits per unit.  
3. Multiply this incremental profit figure by the number of infringing units sold, which equals 
the aggregate lost profits by the patent holder. 108 
In Kalman v. Berlyn Corp., the Federal Circuit held that labor costs were fixed costs because no 
additional labor expense would have been required to produce the infringing devices.109 In other 
circumstances, certain expenses included in “overhead” may be incremental and properly de-
ductible in arriving at incremental profits. For example, fringe benefits may be a type of over-
head cost to be deducted in calculating incremental profits. The facts of each case will dictate the 
nature of the costs associated with producing the infringing product.  
2.3.1.2. Lost Profits in Copyright, Trademark, Trade Secret, and Trade Dress Cases 
In copyright, trademark, trade secret, and trade dress cases, lost profits represent those profits 
that the intellectual property owner failed to earn as a result of the infringement. The lost sales 
measure attempts to equate the intellectual property owner’s damages with the profits that would 
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have been earned from each lost sale due to the infringer’s misconduct. The lost profit test typi-
cally applies only if the intellectual property owner and the infringer were actual or potential 
competitors; otherwise, the infringement is unlikely to have caused the intellectual property 
owner to lose sales.  
The application of the concept of lost profits is similar in copyright, trademark, trade secret, and 
trade dress cases. The discussion of lost profits below applies to all types of intellectual property 
infringement unless otherwise noted. 
2.3.2. Measuring Revenues 
The beginning point in the estimation of lost profits is the measurement of revenues. The primary 
question to be answered is: What additional revenues would have been generated by the plaintiff 
but for the actions of the defendants? That is, if the infringing sales had not occurred, what 
would the purchasers have purchased from the plaintiff, and at what price?   
The following issues are relevant to measuring the revenue on lost sales: 
1. What is the appropriate period of damages? 
2. Are lost profits recoverable for the entire apparatus in which the infringing sale is included, 
or only for the feature covered by the intellectual property in suit? 
3. How is the number of units of the infringing product to be determined? 
4. Can lost profits be recovered for products and services not covered by the intellectual prop-
erty in suit? 
5. Did the infringer cause an effect on the price that the intellectual property holder could have 
charged but for the infringer’s actions? 
These issues are discussed in the following sections. 
2.3.2.1. Damage Period 
The damage period may begin at the onset of infringement of existing intellectual property. In the 
case of patent disputes in which the patent owner’s products are marked as patented, the damage 
period begins when the infringing product is made, sold, imported, or offered for sale.110 Con-
versely, if the patent owner’s products are not marked as patented, the damage period begins 
only when the infringer receives actual notice of infringement and has made, sold, imported, or of-
fered for sale an infringing product.  
The damage period typically ends on the date of trial because an injunction ordinarily will issue 
if the infringer loses its case on liability. However, a patent owner may seek compensation for 
an infringer’s impact on the patent owner’s prospective sales if that impact emanates from 
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the market effect of the infringer’s past infringement. (This issue is particularly relevant to a 
price erosion claim, which is discussed below in Section 2.3.2.3.) In addition, certain types of in-
fringement may inherently continue beyond the trial date. For example, if the term of a contract 
to supply a particular service on patented goods extends beyond the trial date, damages may be 
awarded for sales made after that date. The pendency of an injunction may influence whether 
such damages are awarded. Damages cannot be awarded for infringement that occurred more than 
six years prior to the filing of the complaint for patent disputes.111  
An issue that may affect damages is whether a defendant’s infringement resulted in a market en-
try advantage that would not have existed but for the infringement. If the defendant, after issu-
ance of an injunction, can enter the market again with a competing product sooner than would 
have been possible without the infringement, the plaintiff may suffer additional future lost sales 
and profits. This is most likely to occur if the patent is at or near expiration. 
2.3.2.2. Sales Price 
Damages are often calculated based on the intellectual property owner’s pre-infringement (ac-
tual) sales prices. The courts require documentation from the intellectual property owner to jus-
tify the method or basis for estimating these prices. If multiple models of the same product are 
involved, courts may use the average price of the number and type of model sold.  
Several aspects of the infringed product’s past pricing history may be scrutinized. The product’s 
pricing history may be examined to determine the historical rate of price increases or decreases. 
Additionally, it may be appropriate to compare the historical rate of price increases to the histori-
cal inflation rate so that the impact of inflation is removed. The plaintiff’s pricing models for 
quantity and early pay discounts may also be relevant.  
2.3.2.3. Price Erosion 
A claim for price erosion may exist if (1) the patent holder112 is not able to increase prices as 
much as he or she would have absent the infringement, or (2) the patent holder is forced to de-
crease price in the face of the competition due to the infringer’s conduct. The earliest known case 
involving the issue of price erosion was Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent in 1886.113   
Price erosion was addressed by the Federal Circuit in Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., which 
affirmed a damage award for products sold by the patent holder at a depressed price.114 The pat-
ent holder projected sales through the infringement period based on the rate of pre-infringement 
                                                 
111
 35 USC § 286. 
112
 Price erosion claims are not limited to patent suits, although they are less common in other types of intellectual prop-
erty disputes. 
113
 Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536 (1886). 
114
 Lam Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1067 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
2. Calculating Infringement Damages 
 35
growth for the patented product. The patent holder then calculated the damages by subtracting 
the actual sales from projected sales during the infringement period.115 The projected sales ex-
cluded price reductions implemented to compete with the infringer’s product.116 
Courts have held that a claim for price erosion can be sustained if an infringer’s actions pre-
vented an intellectual property holder from raising prices or maintaining historical price in-
creases. For example, in Ziggity Systems, Inc. v. Val Watering Sys., the court held that “but for” 
the infringement, the patent holder would have raised the price for products covered by the pat-
ent.117 The court applied this theory to both the sales made by the patent holder and those made 
by the infringer, which collectively represented 95 percent of the total market. However, the 
court did not consider the doctrine of price elasticity to be applicable to its analysis.118 Price elas-
ticity, which measures the responsiveness of quantity demanded to a change in price, 119 is dis-
cussed below in Section 2.3.2.5. 
A careful analysis of the industry in which the infringed and infringing products operate is often 
central to assessing a potential price erosion claim. For example, in Crystal Semiconductor vs. 
TriTech, Crystal Semiconductor’s expert witness attempted to measure price erosion by compar-
ing the price performance of (1) the plaintiff’s product covered by the patent-in-suit, and (2) a 
similar product manufactured by the plaintiff that served a different market.120 The expert’s ap-
proach compared the market for Crystal Semiconductor’s computer audio chips in the Apple 
Computer market to the market for Crystal Semiconductor’s computer audio chips in the IBM 
and IBM compatible personal computer (PC) market. This benchmark approach was designed to 
link the price performance of a non-infringed product to the price performance of the infringed 
product as a reasonable proxy. The Federal Circuit, however, found this benchmark approach un-
reliable because the “Apple CODEC market had characteristics of an oligopoly while the PC 
CODEC [IBM compatible] market was competitive.”121 
In Crystal Semiconductor, the Federal Circuit also addressed the necessity of examining the law 
of demand in the context of potential price erosion. In this regard, the court found that Crystal 
had failed “to show the reaction of the market if, ‘but for’ [the] infringement, Crystal would have 
tried to charge at least 89¢ more per CODEC. All markets must respect the law of demand.”122 
In other words, if the patent holder claims it could have charged higher prices but for the in-
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fringement, the patent holder must show the impact of such higher prices on the units demanded 
in the marketplace. 
Another case illustrating the importance of industry analysis in price erosion litigation is Erics-
son, Inc. v. Harris Corporation.123 Ericsson (the patent owner) had contended that it was entitled 
to “lost profits due to lost sales” and “lost profits due to price erosion.” To prove lost profits due 
to lost sales, Ericsson divided the market between the broader “Harris market” and the narrower 
“Ericsson market.” The Harris market included customers that designed the infringing Harris 
product into their products. But these Harris customers may not have designed the Ericsson pat-
ented product into their products, meaning that Harris had actually expanded the market. The nar-
rower Ericsson market was limited to customers that had designed the Ericsson patented product 
into their products. The court upheld this market segmentation, finding that “Ericsson’s market 
definitions and allocations were supported by substantial and economically sound evidence.”124 
To prove lost profits due to price erosion, Ericsson sought to identify factors that precluded com-
petition, including costs to redesign the competing devices as well as the contested patent itself. 
Ericsson also contended that the uniqueness of the market would have enabled it to increase vol-
umes at a higher price. The court acknowledged that Ericsson had “presented evidence of the 
high switching costs associated with redesigning a line card, the relatively low costs of SLICs, . . . 
[and] substantial evidence of the similarities between the two products and their markets.”125 
The Crystal Semiconductor and Ericsson decisions demonstrate two important principles that 
should be addressed in analyzing price erosion claims, namely (1) the possibility that the in-
fringer has expanded the market over what it would have been but for the infringement; and (2) 
the care that should be used in attempting to identify benchmarks. 
2.3.2.4. Considerations in the Calculation of Price Erosion 
In a price erosion calculation, several factors should be examined for their potential effect on the 
non-infringed price. These include the price elasticity of the intellectual property owner’s prod-
uct that competes with the infringing product, and other factors that may influence the prices of 
the two competing products. 
2.3.2.5. Price Elasticity 
The price elasticity of supply and demand is often central to the calculation of damages based on 
alleged price erosion. The price elasticity of demand measures the sensitivity of the quantity de-
manded to price changes of the product.126 Under basic economic principles of supply and de-
                                                 
123
 Ericsson, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 352 F. 3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
124
 Ibid., 352 F. 3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
125
 Ibid. 
126
 Pindyck, R. & Rubinfeld, D. Microeconomics, Fifth Edition. Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey, p. 30, 1998. 
2. Calculating Infringement Damages 
 37
mand, an increase in the price of a product usually results in a decrease in the amount of the 
product demanded.127 Conversely, a decrease in price usually results in an increase in the quantity 
demanded. A product’s price elasticity of demand is the percentage change in quantity demanded 
divided by the percentage change in price.128 In other words, elasticity reveals how much the 
quantity demanded for a product varies with a change in price.  
The interrelationship between price elasticity and price erosion is apparent in 3M vs. Johnson 
and Johnson. In that case, the Special Master ruled that the “vigorous price competition” be-
tween 3M and Johnson & Johnson had caused a reduction in the price of the infringed product 
during the infringement period, and that absent the competition, 3M would have been able to 
raise the price of the product. However, the court found that 3M would have contracted the size 
of the market as a result of the price increases.129 
In its Crystal Semiconductor v. TriTech decision, the court addressed the law of demand and 
price elasticity, quoting the following excerpt from Paul Samuelson’s text, Economics (eleventh 
edition, 1980, pp. 53-55):  
According to the law of demand, consumers will almost always purchase fewer units of a 
product at a higher price than at a lower price, possibly substituting other products. For ex-
ample, if substitution of a product was impossible and the product was a necessity, elasticity 
of demand would be zero—meaning consumers would purchase the product at identical 
rates even when the price increases. This very rare type of market is called inelastic. On the 
other side of the spectrum, if any price increase would eradicate demand, elasticity of de-
mand would be infinite—meaning consumers would decline to purchase another single 
product if the price increases by any amount. This very rare type of market is called per-
fectly elastic.130 
The analyst can use a variety of tools from both statistics and economics to determine the price 
elasticity of demand for a product.  
2.3.2.6. Market Analysis of Infringing Product 
An examination of the market that the plaintiff’s product serves is required to assess the merits of 
a price erosion claim. The number of competitors in a given market influences the prices estab-
lished in that market, with price erosion easier to measure in two-supplier markets than in multi-
supplier markets. However, an intellectual property owner cannot assume that it would capture 
the entire market absent the infringement simply because it operates in a two-supplier market. 
Further, market size can be affected by a number of issues. For example, the defendant may con-
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tend that it had expanded the market by entering it with a lower-priced infringing product, negat-
ing any price erosion claim.131   
The intellectual property owner also cannot assume that the infringer would be absent from the 
market absent the infringement, especially if the infringer sells multiple products, only one of 
which infringes. In such a case, the infringer may affect the size of the market through (1) dis-
counting similar model products, (2) adding features to existing products to entice customers, or 
(3) designing around the patent and offering a new product. 
In a market in which the intellectual property holder and infringer are two competitors among 
many, price erosion may be much more difficult to prove and/or measure. In a market with a 
large number of competing products, price is much less influenced by the actions of a single 
competitor; rather, the entire market acts to set the price. As more and more firms compete in a 
market, each may find it harder to raise prices and avoid losing sales to other firms.132  
Price erosion may also be claimed on products that are serving two different markets. Identifying 
differences in the markets served by the infringing product and the intellectual property owner’s 
product can reveal the factors that influence price in each of those markets.  
2.3.2.7. Substitutes and New Product Entrants 
Potential substitutes for the infringed product from its own segment and competing industries 
should be examined with regards to price erosion. Substitutes that limit the potential returns of an 
industry by placing a ceiling on the prices that firms in that industry can profitably charge133 can 
diminish or invalidate a price erosion claim.  
The threat of new entrants into the infringed product’s industry should also be examined. “New 
entrants to an industry bring new capacity, the desire to gain market share and often substantial 
resources. Prices can be bid down or incumbents’ costs inflated as a result, reducing profitabil-
ity.”134  The likelihood of new entrants into an industry which may have an effect on the price for 
an infringed product should be considered in assessing potential price erosion. Conversely, barri-
ers to entry into an industry or a market may simplify an argument for price erosion. 
2.3.2.8. Power of Suppliers and Buyers 
Suppliers and buyers may influence the price of an infringed product. With respect to buyers, 
factors that may influence price include (1) the percentage of total sales an individual buyer 
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represents to a seller, and (2) the ability of buyers to easily switch to another product.135 If buyers 
of the product which suffered price erosion have significant market power, their impact on the 
market and price of the infringed product should be considered; the lower price may have come 
from buyer power, not additional competition. Similarly, the power of suppliers in the creation of 
the infringed product should be examined.136   
The switching costs of the buyer should also be considered. If the buyer’s costs of switching from 
the patented technology to a different technology are significant, the intellectual property holder 
may have a captive market and prices could be substantially increased without affecting demand.  
2.3.2.9. Entire Market Value Rule 
Lost revenues in intellectual property disputes may be calculated based on the selling price of the 
component of a system that is covered by the intellectual property in suit, or, alternatively, the 
lost revenue may be that lost on the sale of the entire unit, product or system of which the com-
ponent piece was a part. This latter approach is referred to as the entire market value rule, which 
allows for the recovery of damages based on the value of an entire apparatus containing several 
features, even though only one feature is covered by the intellectual property-in-suit.137 The entire 
market value rule ordinarily applies when the nonpatented and patented components are physi-
cally part of the same machine, as in the Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co. case.138 However, some 
courts have extended the rule’s application to physically separate nonpatented components, so 
long as they are considered part of one complete machine or constitute a functional unit.139 
The entire market value rule has been applied to both lost profits and a reasonable royalty, as 
well as to patent and other types of intellectual property disputes. The rule recognizes that, in 
some cases, the economic value of intellectual property may be greater than the value of the sales 
of the covered part alone.140 Essentially, the entire market value rule applies if the patent holder 
would have sold the complete device (rather than just the patented component) if there had been 
no infringement.  
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For example, in King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, the Federal Circuit awarded the patent holder 
lost profits on sales made by the infringer of nonpatented parts for a video tape splicing machine 
that used the patented invention.141 Similarly, in State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., the 
Federal Circuit awarded damages based on the patent holder’s profit margin on the sales of an 
entire water-heating unit. This case concerned the infringement of a patented method for adding 
foam insulation to the water heaters during the manufacturing process.142   
In contrast, in Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, the Federal Circuit declined to award dam-
ages based upon the entire market value rule. Hughes argued that the government had infringed 
its patent controlling the altitude of a spacecraft and that the damage award should include the 
value of the patented device plus the value of the payload. The payload was the non-infringing 
satellite that was attached to the spacecraft with the patented device. The court, however, found 
that Hughes could not reasonably have anticipated the sale of the satellite if it had been granted 
the contract to build the infringing spacecraft.143 As the satellite and the spacecraft did not consti-
tute a functional unit, application of the entire market value rule was unwarranted. 
The entire market value rule may also apply to the determination of a reasonable royalty if the 
patented component is included in a larger device. In that context, the reasonable royalty rate 
may be applied to the sales of the larger device, not just the patented component. However, care 
should be taken to develop a royalty rate consistent with the underlying facts. If an analysis of 
comparable licenses suggests a royalty rate of, for example, five percent applied to sales of the 
patented component, it may be improper to conclude that the five percent should be applied to 
sales of the larger device containing the patented element. Rather, it may be appropriate to re-
duce the royalty rate to compensate for the increased royalty base.  
2.3.2.10. Convoyed or Collateral Sales 
Lost profits can be awarded for the lost sales of ancillary or accessory products (i.e., convoyed or 
collateral sales). Convoyed sales generally include sales of products not covered by the intellec-
tual property in suit but that are caused by the sale or use of that intellectual property.  
When determining whether a patent holder may recover damages for convoyed sales, the analyst 
should be careful to distinguish that issue from the application of the entire market value rule. 
The entire market value rule allows for the recovery of damages based on the value of an entire 
apparatus containing several features, even though only one feature is patented.144 In contrast, 
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convoyed sales are of items that are not typically a physical part of the original device but which 
are sold as a result of the sale of the patented item.  
The Federal Circuit has stated that “[t]he expression ‘convoyed sales’ should preferably be lim-
ited to sales made simultaneously with a basic item; the spare parts here should best be called 
‘derivative sales.’”145 “[I]t is not the physical joinder or separation of the contested items that de-
termine their inclusion in or exclusion from the compensation base for computing a royalty . . . 
so much as their financial and marketing dependence on the patented item under standard mar-
keting procedures for the goods in question.”146   
Regardless of the terminology used, the test for damages remains the same. That is, the intellec-
tual property holder may recover damages for convoyed sales if the intellectual property owner 
can prove that it would have made those sales “but for” the infringement. 
Under the entire market value rule and convoyed sales doctrine, an intellectual property owner is 
not permitted to recover losses for products that are sold with the patented item merely for a 
business or marketing advantage. In Rite-Hite, the Federal Circuit stated that it would not extend 
liability “to include items that have essentially no functional relationship to the patented inven-
tion and that may have been sold with an infringing device only as a matter of convenience or 
business advantage.”147 Further, there should be a reasonable probability that the sale of the pat-
ented item would have caused the sale of the nonpatented accessory. But all facts and circum-
stances should be carefully analyzed. For example, in King Instrument Corporation v. Otari 
Corporation, the court stated that the “infringer had acquired implied license to sell unpatented 
repair parts through payment of damages as to past infringing machine sales and could not be en-
joined from selling any spare parts.”148  
An intellectual property holder may recover damages for lost sales of services related to the pat-
ented invention. In Ristvedt-Johnson, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., the court awarded the patent holder 
lost profits on machine sales, repair services, preventive maintenance inspection agreements, and 
supplies. The plaintiff was able to demonstrate that the one-year maintenance agreements were 
normally purchased when a customer bought the patented coin sorter. However, the court re-
stricted the award for the contracts to the period during which the infringement occurred.149 
2.3.2.11. Lost Revenues in Copyright Cases 
To perform a lost profits calculation in a copyright case, the copyright owner can (1) analyze 
sales for a period before the infringement and compare that to the sales subsequent to the in-
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fringement, or (2) use the infringer’s sales as a base. These techniques are merely a means to an 
end, namely a determination of the magnitude of sales the copyright holder would have made ab-
sent the infringement. 
If the infringing work and the copyrighted work compete at the same price in the same market, 
the infringer’s sales may be used as a measure of sales lost by the copyright owner. Under this 
measure, the court will ordinarily multiply the copyright owner’s profit on one sale by the 
number of sales made by the defendant to arrive at the copyright owner’s actual damages. 
However, it is rare that the copyrighted work price and infringer’s price are the same. Differ-
ences between the copyright owner and the infringer on matters such as pricing, packaging, ad-
vertising, efficiency, cost, production techniques, and goodwill may preclude use of the in-
fringer’s sales as a measure of the copyright owner’s lost sales.150 In essence, to justify a 
one-to-one substitution of the infringer’s sales for the copyright owner’s lost sales, the copyright 
owner should attempt to show that all of the infringer’s customers would have bought the copy-
righted work but for the availability of the infringing product.151   
Even if the copyright owner is not able to use the infringer’s sales as a measure of its own lost 
profits, the owner still may be able to recover the infringer’s profits. For example, in Stevens 
Linen Associates, Inc. v. Mastercraft Corp., the court allowed the copyright owner the choice be-
tween (1) lost profits based on all of defendant’s sales made to customers which had purchased 
from the copyright owner in the past, or (2) lost profits determined by the percentage difference 
in sales of the infringed product compared with the percentage difference in sales of all other 
non-infringed products of the copyright owner . 152 
Courts will ordinarily reject projections made by copyright owners that cannot be supported by 
reasonably probable evidence.153 However, courts may accept probable estimates in the form of 
opinion testimony. If the copyrighted product is sold at a price significantly higher than the de-
fendant’s infringing product, the courts are likely to assume that less than all of the defendant’s 
sales were sales lost by the copyright owner, as the lower price likely caused at least some of the 
defendant’s sales. 
Although many courts have limited the copyright owner to the profits of the infringer as com-
pensation for lost profits, other courts have found this remedy to be insufficient. In F.W. Wool-
worth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, the United States Supreme Court determined that “a rule of 
liability which merely takes away the profits from an infringement would offer little dis-
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couragement to infringers. It would fall short of an effective sanction for enforcement of the 
copyright policy.”154 
In determining the copyright owner’s lost profits, it is necessary to deduct the incremental 
overhead expenses that the copyright owner would have incurred if, in fact, those extra sales had 
been made.155 If overhead expenses would not increase as a result of additional sales, there is no 
need to include overhead costs as a component of the damage measure.  
2.3.3. Measuring Incremental Costs 
As discussed previously, when calculating lost profits, the appropriate benefit stream to measure 
is the incremental profit margin. Determining incremental costs is challenging and often a sig-
nificant source of contention. It is not unusual for the infringer to claim that the intellectual prop-
erty owner would need to increase its costs proportionately with the production of additional 
units or additional revenues. These costs may include increased general and administrative costs 
or other nondirect product related costs. Increasing these types of costs would lower the profits 
on the infringing units, as well as the related damages. In response, the intellectual property 
owner often argues that (1) the gross margin more closely reflects incremental profitability, and 
(2) it would not have been necessary to add equipment, overhead, or infrastructure to produce 
and sell the infringed units. This position, of course, tends to increase profitability from the lost 
sales, as well as related damages. The truth could fall anywhere within the range of these two po-
lar positions, depending on the specific facts and circumstances of the case.156 
A careful examination of costs is essential to determining the profitability of the lost sales. An ex-
amination of each specific cost line item may be necessary. This effort often involves reviewing 
the costs reflected within detailed financial statements, standard accounting records, and other fi-
nancial documents. In lieu of a determination by line item, a statistical analysis of the relationship 
between cost and volume may provide the required cost estimates. Such analysis can identify, on 
average, how much costs have in fact increased for each unit increase in sales volume.157   
One of the initial determinations for each cost item is whether the cost is variable or fixed over 
the range of actual and anticipated incremental production. A comparison of the intellectual 
property owner’s output to the claimed incremental sales can help determine the amount of in-
cremental costs that would need to be incurred to make the incremental sales. For example, a 
doubling in sales may call for an investment in additional manufacturing facilities and manage-
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ment personnel, while an increase of only five percent of a plaintiff’s sales may not require such 
an investment. 
2.3.4. Fixed Costs 
Fixed costs remain constant in total dollar amount as the level of sales activity changes.158 These 
costs typically do not respond to changes in the volume of sales activity within (1) a set period of 
time, or (2) a set production level. Examples of fixed-cost items may include factory and manu-
facturing equipment and buildings, property taxes and certain insurance, charitable contributions, 
research and development, and depreciation.  
Capacity is often an important issue when evaluating fixed costs. If a company has excess capacity, 
it may well have been able to produce and sell the infringed units with little, if any, additional fixed 
costs. Conversely, if the company is operating at or close to full capacity, then additional units of 
production may require additional investments in equipment or other typically fixed costs.  
2.3.5. Variable Costs 
Variable costs are those that change in direct proportion to changes in volume of activity. A variable 
cost is one in which the per-unit cost remains relatively constant as volume changes.159 In other 
words, total variable costs vary as the level of unit sales changes. Although, in theory, variable costs 
are relatively constant as volume changes, this is not always true in economic reality. The analyst 
should closely examine variable costs that may increase or decrease as volume changes. 
Direct materials and direct labor costs are usually variable costs, since the total of these expenses var-
ies directly with the number of units produced. In addition, sales commissions may vary with total 
sales and, therefore, are typically variable. Other variable costs may include factory overhead items 
such as utilities, production supplies, and lubricants. Total variable costs change in direct proportion 
to changes in production volume, which equates to zero dollars when the activity level is zero.  
2.3.6. Semi-Variable Costs or Mixed Costs 
A number of costs have both fixed and variable characteristics.160 Semi-variable or mixed costs 
are expenses that can be separated into fixed and variable components. The variable component 
increases or decreases with sales or production volume, while the fixed component does not 
vary. For example, sales personnel may be paid both a base salary and a commission based on 
                                                 
158
 P. E. Fess and C. S. Warren, Accounting Principles, Sixteenth Edition. Cincinnati, OH:  South-Western Publishing 
Co., p. 810, 1990. 
159
 Gray, J. and Ricketts, D. Cost and Managerial Accounting. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., p. 28, 1983. 
160
 P. E. Fess and C. S. Warren, Accounting Principles, Sixteenth Edition. Cincinnati, OH: South-Western Publishing 
Co., p. 11, 1990. 
2. Calculating Infringement Damages 
 45
sales. Although the base salary component represents a fixed cost, sales commissions fluctuate 
with the amount of sales and represent a variable cost. 
Some costs are considered step variable costs. Step variable costs increase or decrease only in re-
sponse to fairly wide changes in activity level. For example, the cost of an additional mainte-
nance worker may represent a step-variable cost.  
2.3.7. Cost of Goods Sold or Manufacturing Costs 
Cost of goods sold refers to the costs of the manufactured products sold. Typically, these costs 
reflect the raw materials and manufacturing costs used to convert the raw materials into finished 
goods and can include such expenses as storage costs, import taxes, and shipping expenses.  
2.3.8. Gross Profits 
Gross profits refer to the excess of net sales revenue over the cost of goods sold. These profits 
are referred to as “gross” because the operating expenses have not been deducted. The gross 
profit margin is computed by dividing gross profits by net revenues. 
2.3.9. Operating Expenses 
Operating expenses include those expenses incurred in the buying, selling, and administrative 
functions of the business. These activities may be divided so that the selling expenses and the 
general and administrative expenses appear separately. 
2.3.9.1. Selling and Marketing Expenses 
Selling and marketing expenses are costs incurred to promote the sales of the product and gener-
ate revenues. These costs should be directly related to the sale of merchandise. Selling and mar-
keting expenses include salaries for sales and marketing personnel, sales office expenses, travel 
funds, promotions, advertising, and other costs associated with the direct efforts aimed at getting 
products or services from the company to the consumer. These expenses may include marketing 
development costs associated with new products as well as existing products. 
Expenses are often characterized as cost of goods sold, selling and marketing, and general and 
administrative. However, the character of the expenses depends on the nature of the industry. 
Fixed expenses in one industry or one business can be variable in another.   
2.3.9.2. General and Administrative Expenses 
General and administrative expenses include expenses associated with general expenditures on 
the administrative side of the business. These expenses can include accounting services, payroll 
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and human resources, management information services, cash management (accounts payable 
and accounts receivable), as well as other support activities. The costs of these services typically 
do not vary with the company’s production output. However, the facts and circumstances in each 
case vary and need to be analyzed.  
2.3.9.3. Incremental Profit Margin 
The calculation of the incremental profit margin requires a determination of which costs are 
fixed and which costs are variable over a known increase to various levels of sales volume. In 
general, firms with historically high variable and low fixed costs (such as consulting firms) will 
have lower incremental profits relative to firms with historically low variable costs and high 
fixed costs (such as software firms).  
After assessing the historical movement of the cost relative to volume and considering the type 
of cost, the cost is classified as either fixed or variable. A review and analysis of the income 
statement may be necessary to obtain the incremental profit margin on additional units sold. 
Generally, an income statement categorizes costs into cost of goods sold, operating expenses, 
and general and administrative expenses. Income statement items that are often ignored in a 
damage calculation include gains or losses from discontinued operations, extraordinary income, 
and/or extraordinary expenses.161 Generally, lost profits are calculated on a pretax basis. 
To measure the incremental costs associated with the increased units sold, the courts have typi-
cally adopted two approaches, namely (1) account analysis, and (2) regression analysis. Account 
analysis “involves examining accounts at the general ledger level and determining whether that 
cost is fixed or variable.”162 Regression analysis “is a statistical technique for determining the re-
lationship between two variables”163 and is applied to cost and volume data. Before relying upon 
a regression analysis, the analyst should have a thorough understanding of regression modeling.  
Although regression analysis can generate an unbiased estimate of, for example, the average cost 
incurred in manufacturing each unit, the quality or value of that estimate depends on the preci-
sion of the estimate. Regression analysis generates not only estimates of model parameters, but 
also estimates of the precision of the analysis, often referred to as the standard error. Standard 
tools of statistics allow a determination of whether a level of precision is acceptable, a condition 
referred to as statistical significance. The analyst should evaluate whether the results of a regres-
sion analysis are “statistically significant.” 
Courts have considered the relative reliability of account and regression analyses. For example, 
in Micro Motion, Inc. v. Exac Corp., the court weighed the reliability of an account analysis against a 
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regression and historical analysis in an effort to determine the costs that the patent holder would 
have incurred had it produced the units that were sold by the infringer.164 The court determined 
that the regression analysis was of little probative value and declined to follow it, because it 
found that the regression analysis was more applicable to cases involving well-established firms 
with regular sales, not one that had substantial nonrecurring costs. Instead, the court adopted the 
account analysis that classified each cost as a variable, semivariable, or a fixed cost.165 
In contrast, the court in Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co. rejected an account analysis in favor 
of a regression analysis.166 The court found that the account analysis relied too heavily on the subjec-
tive assessments of the parties and was subject to undue bias.167 The court also rejected the account 
analysis because it lacked supporting documentation, including an absence of working papers, notes, or 
the names of personnel contacted.168 Additionally, the court found problematic that the account analysis 
was performed for only one year, although the infringement had occurred over multiple years. 
In addition to the analyses discussed above, the expert analyzing costs should consider the fol-
lowing factors: 
• When looking at costs of sales and individual line items over time as compared with unit pro-
duction, care should be taken in analyzing the basis for inventory costing. That is, first-in, first-
out; last-in, first-out; or average inventory costing may yield dramatically different results.  
• Cost studies which provide information about what costs are specifically associated with the 
production or sale of units should be considered. 
• Contracts can clarify what the commissions are on incremental unit sales or what the costs of 
materials are at various material purchase levels (for example, considering quantity discounts). 
• Invoices showing purchases of inventories or materials, including those reflecting price in-
creases, may help the expert ascertain what portion of cost increases were driven by changes in 
unit production or sales, as compared to other causes. 
2.4. REASONABLE ROYALTY 
Once infringement has been proven in patent cases, the patent holder is entitled to “damages 
adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty.”169 
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In the event lost profit damages cannot be proven for all of the alleged infringing sales, then 
the patent owner is entitled to reasonable royalties from use of the patented technology for the 
remaining units sold by the infringer. In other words, the patent holder is entitled to some form 
of damages on all the infringing sales.  
In nonpatent intellectual property disputes, reasonable royalty is neither the base case nor the 
minimum award. However, it remains an alternative measure of damage and is available under 
appropriate circumstances. For example, the UTSA (as amended in 1985) states that “[i]n lieu of 
damages measured by any other methods, the damages caused by misappropriation may be 
measured by imposition of liability for a reasonable royalty for a misappropriator’s unauthorized 
disclosure or use of a trade secret.”170   
The case law on reasonable royalty for nonpatent intellectual property suits borrows from the 
more developed body of case law from patent disputes. As a result, the discussion below relating 
to the parameters and guidelines provided for reasonable royalties in the context of patent dis-
putes is generally applicable to other types of intellectual property infringement, unless other-
wise noted. Of course, in all intellectual property disputes the reasonable royalty to be paid to 
plaintiff by defendant is governed by the particular facts of the case. 
A starting point in determining a reasonable royalty is an established royalty—that amount paid 
by the parties for the intellectual property in suit—as it is based upon the voluntary agreement of 
a licensor and a licensee. When an established royalty does not exist or cannot be proven in suf-
ficient detail, the analyst may need to calculate a royalty that would result from a hypothetical 
negotiation between the parties. These alternatives are discussed in the sections below. 
2.4.1. Established Royalty  
To recover an award of damages based on an established royalty rate, the patent owner needs to 
show that a licensing agreement covering the patent was entered into with another party, typi-
cally prior to a lawsuit or threat of a lawsuit.171 The patent holder may have to demonstrate that 
multiple parties have found the royalty rate to be reasonable.172 Some courts have held that a sin-
gle licensing agreement may be insufficient and unreliable to prove an established royalty rate.173 
In general, the analyst should consider whether the royalty rate was accepted by enough mem-
bers in the industry to be considered reasonable. Additionally, the analyst should consider 
whether or not existing licenses are truly comparable to the dispute between the patent holder 
and infringer.   
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In evaluating established or otherwise existing royalty rates for the purposes of determining the 
reasonable royalty that an infringer should pay the patent holder, it often appears appropriate to 
suggest royalty adjustments to account for inherent differences between the existing agreement 
and the hypothetical negotiation (for example, the certainty regarding infringement and valid-
ity, or the perceived threat of litigation). Although such differences may be real and suggest 
the need for an adjustment, the analyst should not fail to consider all the inherent differences 
between actual negotiations and hypothetical negotiations. For example, actual negotiations 
usually include the transfer of knowledge and know-how, as well as documentation and some-
times continued support. These items, often of substantial value, are normally not transferred 
to infringers. The analyst should use caution when deciding how to properly quantify the over-
all royalty adjustment. 
2.4.2. Hypothetical Negotiation 
A reasonable royalty analysis attempts to determine a royalty the patent owner would have ob-
tained in an arm’s-length “hypothetical negotiation” between the patent owner (as a willing li-
censor) and the infringer (as a willing licensee) just prior to the onset of infringement. This 
“hypothetical negotiation” analysis is inherently different from a “real-world” negotiation, in 
that it assumes that both parties agree the patent is valid and that the infringer’s use of the tech-
nology is infringing. In light of the artificial nature of the hypothetical negotiation, a patent owner 
is not required to prove the reasonable royalty and its resulting damages with exact certainty but 
rather “as a matter of just and reasonable inference.”174 (In this regard, refer to Section 2.3.2.9., 
“Entire Market Value Rule.”) 
The hypothetical negotiation assumes that both parties would have been willing and able to nego-
tiate a license agreement and that the negotiation took place at the time of first infringement. 
While the hypothetical negotiation is assumed to occur at the time of first infringement, it would 
be wrong to conclude that this timing should generally result in a “last minute premium” to be 
applied to the reasonable royalty.  
It may appear that, like in a valuation, only information available as of the date of the supposed 
hypothetical negotiation could be used to determine the value of the royalty. However, despite the 
fact that the hypothetical negotiation should be as of the date of first infringement, the courts have 
considered information subsequent to the hypothetical negotiation date in determining the damage 
award.175 This information is typically referred to as the “Book of Wisdom.” 
In deciding the reasonable royalty issues, the Panduit court addressed the following issues con-
cerning the hypothetical negotiation: 
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The setting of a reasonable royalty after infringement cannot be treated, as it was here, as 
the equivalent of ordinary royalty negotiations among truly ‘willing’ patent owners and li-
censees. That view would constitute a pretense that the infringement never happened. It 
would also make an election to infringe a handy means for competitors to impose a ‘com-
pulsory license’ policy upon every patent owner. Except for the limited risk that the patent 
owner, over years of litigation, might meet the heavy burden of proving the four elements 
required for recovery of lost profits, the infringer would have nothing to lose, and every-
thing to gain if he could count on paying only the normal, routine royalty non-infringers 
might have paid. As said by this court in another context, the infringer would be in a ‘heads-
I-win, tails-you-lose’ position.176   
The analyst understands that in an actual negotiation between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller, neither party is required to undertake the transaction. However, in a hypothetical negotia-
tion, both parties are required to consummate the transaction. Therefore, the hypothetical nego-
tiation needs to consider the specific circumstances surrounding both parties, such as financial 
position, competitive strategies, and market position.    
A seminal case for determining a reasonable royalty rate is Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Ply-
wood Corp., which identified 15 factors that need to be considered in a reasonable royalty rate 
calculation. These factors are discussed in the following sections. 
2.4.2.1. Georgia-Pacific Factors  
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp.177 provided a list of 15 factors that the court con-
sidered important in determining a reasonable royalty rate. These factors have been widely 
adopted by the courts for use in calculating a reasonable royalty rate in a patent case. Not all of 
the factors will be considered in each case, nor will they all have the same level of importance in 
each case. In discussing the 15 factors, the court indicated that “. . . there is no formula by which 
these factors can be rated precisely in the order of their relative importance or by which their 
economic significance can be automatically transduced into their pecuniary equivalent.”178 
The 15 Georgia Pacific factors are as follows: 
1. The royalties received by the patent holder for the licensing of the patent in suit, proving or 
tending to prove an established royalty. 
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit. 
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive, or as restricted or 
nonrestricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the manufactured product may 
be sold. 
                                                 
176
 Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, 575 F.2d 1152, 1158 (Sixth Cir. 1978) 
177
 Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 F.2d 295 
(Second Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971). 
178
 Ibid. 
2. Calculating Infringement Damages 
 51
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent mo-
nopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses under special cir-
cumstances designed to preserve that monopoly. 
5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as whether they 
are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business or whether they are inven-
tor and promoter. 
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products of the licen-
see; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-
patented item; and the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales. 
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license. 
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent, its commercial suc-
cess, and its current popularity. 
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, 
which had been used for working out similar results. 
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as 
owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to those who have used the invention. 
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention, and any evidence probative 
of the value of that use. 
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular busi-
ness or in a comparable business to allow for the use of the invention or analogous inventions. 
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as distinguished 
from nonpatented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features 
or improvements added by the infringer.  
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts. 
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patent holder) and a licensee (such as the infringer) 
would have agreed upon if both had reasonably and voluntarily tried to reach an agreement; 
that is, the amount that a prudent licensee—who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain 
a license to manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented invention—
would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit and 
the amount that would have been acceptable by a prudent patent holder who was willing to 
grant a license.179 
2.4.2.2. Classification of the Georgia-Pacific Factors 
A treatise on the subject of intellectual property law and damages classifies the 15 Georgia-
Pacific factors into two broad groupings of: (1) licensing activity (including prior and existing li-
censes, licensing policies and industry customs); and (2) the value of the patent (including an-
ticipated profits, benefits of the invention, value of the invention, available non-infringing alter-
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natives, and the duration of the patent).180 The treatise’s valuable description of the interplay of 
the issues presented in the Georgia-Pacific case and the hypothetical negotiation follows:181 
[a] Licensing Activity 
The patent owner’s and the industry’s licensing activity naturally plays an important 
role in determining a reasonable royalty award. Although prior licenses sold by a patent 
owner may be insufficient to create an established royalty rate, these prior or existing 
rates are carefully weighed by the courts in determining a reasonable royalty. The courts 
reason that the actual results reached by a willing seller and willing buyer in a similar 
patent negotiation should reasonably mirror any hypothetical negotiation between patent 
owner and the defendant at the time of infringement.182 Additionally, even if the prior li-
censes were obtained under threat of litigation or in settlement, the royalty rate of the li-
cense is still some evidence of a reasonable royalty.183 
In addition to the rates paid by other licensees, the rates paid by other industry partici-
pants for comparable patents may be used in calculating damages. Because, in most 
cases, a hypothetical negotiation would be undertaken without knowledge as to the fu-
ture profitability of the patented invention, the courts reason that the willing buyer and 
the willing seller would be guided by the customary practice in the industry. Recogniz-
ing the unfairness of “rewarding” an infringer by permitting an award equal to that 
which would have been negotiated if the defendant was not an adjudicated infringer, 
however, the Federal Circuit has affirmed cases awarding substantially higher royalty 
rates than would have been negotiated under industry norms.184 Thus, “industry cus-
tom” is rarely given decisive effect due to the generally unique character of both the 
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patented invention and the market circumstances under which the license would be 
purchased and utilized.185 
Despite the fact that the fifteen factors used to determine a reasonable royalty are based on 
the premise that a hypothetical negotiation took place, the courts properly give weight to 
any restrictive licensing policies of the patent owner. A formal written policy does not 
have to exist; rather, the patent owner’s licensing policy can be established by taking into 
account its prior licensing activities. Furthermore, no matter what the policy or prior licens-
ing activity, a patent owner may wish to demonstrate that it had the capacity to make the 
infringing sales and, accordingly, the patent owner would not have licensed the defendant 
without substantial financial inducement.186 
The rationale behind giving any consideration to the patent owner’s licensing policies is that 
if the patent owner generally refuses to grant licenses to its invention, a higher royalty 
would be justified in order to induce the hypothetical sale. Some courts have arbitrarily 
applied a high arithmetical weight to this factor, thereby justifying a higher-than-market roy-
alty rate.187 On the other hand, some courts have assigned little value to the patent owner’s 
licensing policy and thus found relatively conservative reasonable royalty rates.188 
[b] Value of the Patent 
All of the factors in the second category of the fifteen Georgia-Pacific factors relate to the 
value of the patent generally and to the defendant specifically. It is axiomatic that the per-
ception of the parties to a negotiation about the value of the patent would be important in de-
termining the outcome of those negotiations. Accordingly, the courts consider what the 
defendant infringer anticipates its profits and cost savings would be by using the patent 
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compared to use of non-infringing devices or processes. Again, a willing buyer would 
only agree to a royalty if it was predictable that he would obtain an economic benefit, such 
as a higher projected profit. 
In determining anticipated profits at the time of the hypothetical negotiation, the courts often 
consider the infringer’s actual profit performance over the period of infringement.189 Even 
though the courts look to anticipated profits, the reasonable royalty award is not a lost prof-
its damage theory. Indeed, because the determination of a reasonable royalty should be 
based on anticipated profits, “there is no rule that a royalty be no higher than the infringer’s 
net profit margin.”190 In fact, the Federal Circuit has held that it is irrelevant that the in-
fringer did not actually meet its anticipated profit projections.191 
Additionally, although “[t]he established royalty rate . . . should be applied only to sales of 
infringing products to avoid running afoul of the policy in patent law against extending 
patents beyond their lawful scope,” the courts recognize that the infringer’s anticipated 
profits may include collateral benefits in addition to direct profits from the patented in-
vention, which the parties would take into account in negotiating a reasonable royalty 
rate.192 In other words, a potential licensee would consider the profits that it would 
obtain from convoyed sales of parts, supplies, accessories, and related products, as 
well as those profits that flow or would be expected to flow from the right to manufac-
ture, use or sell that patented invention. The theory is that “[w]here a hypothetical licensee 
would have anticipated increased convoyed sales as a result of a patent license, such sales 
may be considered in fixing a reasonable royalty rate because the licensee would in 
theory be disposed to pay a higher royalty if it could expect such collateral benefits.”193 
Moreover, if the patent owner is in the business of selling the patented product, he would 
have demanded a higher royalty to compensate for the loss of such collateral benefits. 
In addition, in determining the value of the patent, the relative contribution of the patented 
feature is a factor that is taken into account. If the contribution of the patented invention is 
significant, a higher royalty would have resulted from the hypothetical negotiation.194 
Conversely, if the patent were less significant, then a “willing buyer” would have been 
less willing to pay a higher royalty. In assessing the relative importance of this factor, 
courts may look to whether the patent was a “pioneer patent,” under the theory that a pio-
neer patent has manifest commercial success.195 Nevertheless, because the relative contri-
bution of a patented invention varies greatly within each field and for each patent, the weight 
accorded this factor varies with the circumstances of the individual case. 
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It is also assumed that a “willing buyer” in a hypothetical negotiation would be more 
disposed to pay a higher royalty if the patented invention was fully developed and 
commercially in place. The rationale is that the buyer would have to expend less time and 
capital to bring its product or service to market. As such, a buyer would pay more for a 
“developed” invention than for one that the buyer was required to spend substantial capital 
and investment to develop, market, use or commercialize. 
Another important factor that is considered in the hypothetical negotiation is the remaining 
term of the patent at the time of the infringement. Generally, it is believed that a buyer 
would have been more likely to agree to a higher royalty the longer the remaining term of 
the patent. A defendant, however, may argue that the longer the remaining patent term, the 
lower the royalty. That is, knowing it would have to pay considerable royalties for an ex-
tended period, the defendant may argue that it would have had a greater incentive to 
design around the patent.196 
Finally, in assessing a reasonable royalty, the courts will take into consideration whether the 
defendant had any non-infringing alternatives that were equal in terms of cost and perform-
ance. If a non-infringing alternative exists, the defendant, as the “willing buyer,” 
“would have been in a stronger position to negotiate for a lower royalty rate knowing it 
had a competitive noninfringing device in the wings.”197 The defendant infringer, 
however, must prove that: (1) the alternative is sufficiently similar to the infringed patent, 
and (2) the non-infringing alternative was available, that is, in existence and covered by a 
patent owned by a third party, at the time the infringement began.198 On the other hand, the 
patent owner may demonstrate that the infringer’s copying of the patented invention dem-
onstrates that the invention is not “worthless,” but rather shows that the invention has 
“several advantages” over the proposed non-infringing alternatives.199 
2.4.2.3. Date of Hypothetical Negotiation 
For measuring reasonable royalty rates, the courts have looked to the date when infringement 
first began. The hypothetical licensor and licensee are assumed to voluntarily meet on that date 
with information that addresses the first fourteen Georgia-Pacific factors and agree upon a rea-
sonable royalty. This form of analysis limits the information available for the hypothetical ne-
gotiation to that available (1) before the commercial success of the patent could be determined, 
(2) before actual profitability could be determined, and (3) even before customer acceptance 
could be determined. It limits the estimation of a reasonable royalty to budget, forecast, plan 
pricing, and project operating costs, and, therefore, projections of profits.  
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Notably, it is often many years after infringement starts before the patent holder becomes aware 
of the infringement, brings suit against the defendant, and litigates the issues. In addition, trials 
often are held years after the patent holder notifies the infringer of infringement and the in-
fringement suit is filed. During this extended period, much information becomes available 
about the patent and its success that might not have been anticipated or available at the hypo-
thetical negotiation date when infringement began. As a result, the analyses and outcomes un-
der the first fourteen Georgia-Pacific factors will often be different if the court limits itself to in-
formation available on or before the date of first infringement.  
The courts have addressed the use of information that becomes available only after the date at 
which the hypothetical negotiation is assumed to have taken place (the date of first infringe-
ment). For example, in Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Company, the court stated 
that “[t]he methodology encompasses fantasy and flexibility; fantasy because it requires a court 
to imagine what warring parties would have agreed to as willing negotiators; flexibility because 
it speaks of negotiations as of the time infringement began, yet permits and often requires a 
court to look to events and facts that occurred thereafter and that could not have been known to 
or predicted by the hypothesized negotiators.” 200   
Some courts have cautioned against treating the negotiation as one with full knowledge of future 
events. In Integra Lifesciences v. Merck, the Federal Circuit ruled that “[t]he first step in a rea-
sonable royalty calculation is to ascertain the date on which the hypothetical negotiation in ad-
vance of infringement would have occurred.”201 The Federal Circuit went on to reverse and re-
mand the reasonable royalty verdict because “the record does not clearly indicate whether 1994 
or 1995 is the proper date for the first infringement.”202 In its opinion, the court emphasized 
the importance of determining the first date of infringement because “[t]he value of a hypo-
thetical license negotiated in 1994 could be dramatically different from one undertaken in 
1995 . . . [as] a year can make a great difference in economic risks and rewards.”203 
2.4.2.4. Analyses to Support an Opinion on a Hypothetical Negotiation 
To maximize the effectiveness of an analysis of a hypothetical negotiation, the expert may want 
to perform the following types of analysis, depending on the facts of the case, consistent with the 
Georgia Pacific and hypothetical negotiation parameters: 
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Georgia  
Pacific  
Factor(s) Analysis Where to Find 
1, 2, 3 Review of existing license agreements pertaining to the 
intellectual property in suit or similar intellectual property. 
These agreements may be between plaintiff and 
defendant, between either of the parties and others not 
involved in the suit, or between parties not involved in  
the suit. In general, the closer the technology and the 
parties, the more relevant the agreements. 
Commercial royalty databases, public filings, 
licenses involving the parties to the case 
(often produced in discovery), financial 
records of the parties. 
8, 12, 13 Profitability of products covered by the intellectual  
property in suit compared to that of other products. 
Company financial records, public filings, 
sales reports, and invoices. 
8, 9, 10 Review of marketing materials to determine the 
importance of the covered feature to the sales and 
profitability of covered and infringing products. 
Company financial statements, internal 
company correspondence, marketing plans, 
correspondence with customers, sales 
training materials, customer opinion surveys. 
5 Documents pertaining to the competitive relationship 
between the companies. 
Internal correspondence, licensing history and 
correspondence, each party’s customer list. 
4 Documents pertaining to the amount of protection and 
effort the plaintiff places on its intellectual property. 
Correspondence, testimony of company 
management. 
9 Cost savings and other benefits of the intellectual  
property in suit. 
Internal correspondence, financial records, 
and correspondence. 
15 Financial position of companies and need for  
intellectual property and product sales. 
Financial statements and records over time, 
particularly as of date of first infringement. 
6 Collateral sales and related product sales. Sales invoices showing how often the 
products are sold together, marketing 
literature. 
2.4.3. Updates to Georgia-Pacific 
In Honeywell v. Minolta, the court’s jury instructions provided a list of factors to consider when 
determining a reasonable royalty.204 This list—which differs somewhat from the Georgia Pacific 
list of 15 factors—includes the following factors: 
1. The anticipated amount of profits the prospective licensor reasonably thinks would be lost, as 
a result of licensing the patent, compared to the anticipated royalty income. 
2. The relative bargaining strengths of both the patent owner and the infringer.  
3. The anticipated net profits that the prospective infringer reasonably thinks they will earn. 
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4. The commercial past performance of the product, i.e., in terms of profits and public acceptance.  
5. The market to be “tapped.”  
6. Any other economic factor that would be taken into account by a normally prudent business-
man, under similar circumstances, when negotiating a hypothetical license. 
Although the Georgia-Pacific and Honeywell v. Minolta factors provide guidelines when deter-
mining a reasonable royalty, they do not represent the only viable approaches to determining a 
reasonable royalty. “The amount of a reasonable royalty after infringement turns on the facts of 
each case, as best they may be determined.”205 For assistance in the establishment of a royalty rate, 
the analyst may want to consult searchable databases such as those identified on Appendix A. 
2.4.4. Other Methods of Measurement 
2.4.4.1. The 25-Percent Rule 
Under this methodology, the royalty rate is set between 25 and 33 percent of operating profit de-
pending on a number of factors and considerations between the patent holder and the infringer.206 
The rationale for leaving between 67 and 75 percent of the profits to the licensee is the assump-
tion of greater financial risk in commercializing the technology.  
Although this methodology has received criticism for being overly simplistic, it has proven use-
ful to the courts:  
The 25% rule is a shorthand phrase for a method of dividing expected profit between a li-
censor and licensee. It divides net pretax profit with normally 25% of that profit being paid 
to the licensor as a reasonable royalty, while 75% is reserved to the licensee as its profit for 
the risks attendant to manufacturing and marketing. Normally, the net profit that is divided is 
. . . that of the licensee. Sometimes the licensor’s net profit rate may be used, however, 
where the licensee’s profit rate is not known. While a trial court is not limited to selecting 
one or the other of the specific royalty figures proposed by the opposing parties, SmithKline 
Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d at 1168, the court here finds that the 25% 
rule is an appropriate rationale for determining a base royalty rate. Defendant’s licensing 
expert, Mr. Robert Goldscheider, noted that he first became familiar with the 75%/25% dis-
tribution of licensing profits when he began to do licensing work in 1959 and 1960. Since 
that time, defendant’s expert has participated in several hundred licensing negotiations in-
volving intellectual property, and, according to Mr. Goldscheider, he and “at least two other 
highly respected pioneers in the field of licensing” have written published works concerning 
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the 25% rule. In addition, the 25% rule or a close variant of it has been recognized by a 
number of other federal courts as a “rule of thumb” or “typical” in the licensing field.207   
Although sole reliance on the 25 percent rule may not be appropriate, the rule may be useful as 
a starting point or frame of reference. The results should be adjusted based on all relevant facts 
and circumstances.  
2.4.4.2. The Analytical Method  
Another measurement methodology is the analytical method. The royalty calculation under this 
method is based on the infringer’s own internal profit projections for the infringing item at the 
time the infringement began. The analytical method is based on the premise that any rate of re-
turn in excess of a normal rate of return can be attributed to the patent. This method takes the 
profits of the infringer, subtracts the infringer’s normal profit, and awards some portion of the 
remainder to the patent owner. 
For example, in TWM Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Dura Corp.,208 the Special Master computed “reasonable 
royalty” damages based on an internal memorandum, written by the infringer’s top management 
before the infringement began. The memo indicated that the infringer projected a substantial 
gross profit (52.7 percent) from the proposed infringing sales. Using this figure, the Special Mas-
ter subtracted overhead expenses to obtain the infringer’s projected net operating profit (37 per-
cent to 42 percent) and then divided the projected net operating profit between the infringer and 
the patent holder. The Special Master concluded that, at the time infringement began, the in-
fringer would have accepted the standard industry profit on the item. The profit for the infringer 
was set at the standard industry rate (6.6 percent to 12.5 percent), and the remaining 30 percent 
became the “reasonable royalty.” 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, the infringer contended that it was erroneous for the Special 
Master to use this method, asserting that the more traditional “willing licensor-willing licensee” 
test was legally mandated. The infringer also downplayed the significance of its pre-infringement 
memorandum, highlighting instead that the actual profits realized on the infringing products 
were much lower than the projected figures. The Federal Circuit, however, rejected the in-
fringer’s contentions and affirmed the award. After noting that there is no single way to deter-
mine patent damages, the Federal Circuit held that it was of no consequence that a lesser royalty 
may have resulted from another analysis.209 “On appeal, an infringer cannot successfully argue 
that the district court abused its discretion in awarding ‘high’ royalty by simply substituting its 
own recomputation to arrive at a lower figure.”210 The only relevant question was whether or not 
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the method used by the lower court was proper, and the appellate court concluded that it was. In 
particular, the Federal Circuit upheld the Special Master’s use of the analytical method because, 
unlike the infringer’s alternative, it focused on the critical time when infringement began rather 
than thereafter. 
Although making profit projections is typically not straightforward, an advantage of the analyti-
cal method to the patent holder is that it attempts to use the information upon which the infringer 
based its decision to infringe. In some cases, pre-infringement projections can become a real im-
pediment to the infringer in the midst of litigation. As discussed above, the courts have found 
pre-infringement memorandums and projections to be particularly relevant, since the infringer 
based its decision to manufacture and market the infringing product on the very information be-
ing used to determine the reasonable royalty amount.  
An infringer’s defense to a reasonable royalty case based on the analytical method is often to at-
tack its own profit projections. Rather than present evidence of a lower actual profit margin or 
evidence dated after the date infringement first began, the infringer attempts to undercut the reli-
ability of its own proprietary documents dating from the time when infringement began. 
2.4.4.3. Discounted Cash Flow Analysis 
Discounted cash flow analysis is a method of valuing an investment based on the estimated fu-
ture cash flows, taking into consideration the time value of money.211 “The discounted cash flow 
(DCF) method for determining a corporation’s enterprise value has three main components: (a) 
an estimation of net cash flows that the firm will generate and when, over some period; (b) a 
terminal or residual value equal to the future value, as of the end of the projection period, of the 
firm’s cash flows beyond the projection period; and (c) a cost of capital with which to discount to a 
present value both the projected net cash flows and the estimated terminal or residual value . . . 
[with] ‘terminal value’ [being] the value of cash flows expected to be received by the company 
beyond the ‘terminal year’ (which is the final year for which particularized cash flow projections 
are made) discounted to the ‘present value’. . . “212 
2.4.5. Reasonable Royalty in Copyright Disputes 
In copyright disputes, if the copyright owner and the infringer compete in the same market, 
the courts may use a lost sales measurement to compensate for the sales that would have been 
made “but for” the defendant’s infringement. If the owner and infringer serve different mar-
kets, the courts may use a reasonable royalty or market value test to determine the hypothetical 
reasonable royalty that the copyright owner would have received for the defendant’s use. In a 
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dual market context, some courts have held that the value lost by the copyright owner should 
be approximated from the infringer’s acts that prevented the copyright owner from taking 
advantage of that particular market.  
Unlike the patent law, the Copyright Act makes no mention of treating a reasonable royalty as a 
minimum damage measure. Not unlike the patent law, however, the question posed by Section 
504(b) is “what a willing buyer would have been reasonably required to pay to a willing seller 
for plaintiffs’ work.”213   
The measurement of damages for copyright infringement is not as well established as that for 
patent infringement, in large part because appeals of copyright cases are taken to the appellate 
court in the region in which the case was filed, rather than solely to the Federal Circuit. This 
causes judicial precedent in copyright cases to be regional in nature rather than national in 
scope. The copyright analyst is advised to seek counsel’s input and review case law from per-
tinent jurisdictions.  
If the court selects a reasonable royalty measure of damages, it may attempt to determine the 
amount that the infringer would have paid for the right to use the copyrighted work legally. Just 
as in patent cases, any preexisting licenses may offer a measure of the appropriate reasonable 
royalty.214 For example, in McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., the court determined that 
the jury had ample evidence from which to estimate the value of the competitor’s use of the 
copyrighted source code and arrive at its $1.2 million actual damage award for copyright in-
fringement. Finding that the jury had evidence of the copyright owner’s past agreements with the 
infringing competitor to develop and modify prior versions of the copyrighted material, the court 
ruled that there was a sufficient basis for the damage award.215   
The reasonable royalty may take the form of a lump sum representing the reasonable value of the 
work. Alternatively, the royalty may be a percentage of the licensee’s profits. In On Davis v. The 
Gap, Inc., the court determined that a copyright owner’s loss of a reasonable royalty or license 
fee to which a willing buyer and a willing seller would have agreed may serve as its “actual dam-
ages” supporting recovery under the Copyright Act.216 
A defendant may attempt to distinguish preexisting licenses based on (1) the types of uses that 
they authorized, (2) the amount of the copyrighted work that was used, and (3) the changing 
value of the copyrighted work over time. 
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2.4.6 Unjust Enrichment 
Unjust enrichment is an alternative damages measure to compensatory damages. While compen-
satory damages seek to restore the plaintiff to the financial position in which it would have been 
but for the defendant’s wrongful act, unjust enrichment seeks to deprive the defendant of what-
ever gain or benefit it obtained from the wrongful act. In essence, unjust enrichment compels the 
defendant to disgorge all ill-gotten gains to the owner of the infringed intellectual property.  
As discussed previously, Dan Dobbs (in his book Dobbs Law of Remedies: Damages—Equity 
Restitution) identified five methods for measuring the gain obtained by a defendant for purposes 
of an unjust enrichment award.217 The unjust enrichment remedy is frequently employed by the 
courts in copyright, trademark, and trade secret litigation and is incorporated in the federal stat-
utes governing intellectual property. With respect to copyrights, Section 504(b) of the Copyright 
Act provides that “[t]he copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by 
him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer that are attributable to 
the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual damages.”218 Therefore, 
unless it is duplicative, recovery of both actual damages and the defendant’s profits is allowed. 
With respect to trademarks, the Lanham Act authorizes a trademark owner to recover both the in-
fringer’s profits and its own damages sustained “subject to the principles of equity and upon such 
terms as the court deems reasonable . . .”219 
The UTSA provides that, in addition to recovering its actual loss, a trade secret owner may re-
cover the “unjust enrichment” caused by the misappropriation to the extent the enrichment is not 
taken into account in calculating the owner’s actual loss.220 Unjust enrichment is also permitted as 
a measure of damages in design patent disputes, but it is unavailable for utility patents. 
A copyright owner may be entitled to recover indirect profits from copyright infringement. How-
ever, before doing so, the copyright owner must first demonstrate that the infringing acts had an 
effect on the profits earned by the infringer.221 In Mackie v. Rieser, the court determined that the 
artist was not entitled to indirect profits from the symphony’s infringement of his copyrighted 
sculpture, even through an unauthorized photograph of the sculpture was used in an advertising 
brochure. The court indicated that since it could not determine how many individuals subscribed 
because of the artist’s work, any claim for indirect profit was speculative and unsupported.222   
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In Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the issue of indirect profits of the infringer.223 In that case, the court determined that the 
MGM Grand Hotel had infringed on a music copyright belonging to Frank Music. The music 
was part of MGM’s musical revue entitled Hallelujah Hollywood and was heavily promoted to 
the public as a lead attraction of MGM. After calculating actual damages for infringement, the 
court determined that the copyright owner was entitled to indirect profits and the court awarded 
the copyright owner a portion of MGM’s total profits. However, before indirect profits may be 
awarded, the court “must conduct a threshold inquiry into whether there is a legally sufficient 
causal link between the infringement and the subsequent indirect profits.”224 
Revenues to be included in an unjust enrichment measure of damages may need to reflect appli-
cation of the entire market value rule. Refer to the discussion in Section 2.3.2.9., “Entire Market 
Value Rule,” above. If more than simply the copyrighted or trademarked work is included in 
revenues, an apportionment of the resulting profit to the infringement may be necessary. Refer to 
the discussion in Section 2.4.6.2, “Apportionment,” below. 
2.4.6.1. Costs in Unjust Enrichment Claims 
As indicated above, profits from unjust enrichment, as well as for lost profits, are calculated as 
sales from the units in question, less costs associated with producing and selling the additional 
units. In both lost profits and unjust enrichment claims, the burden to prove the sales in question 
falls on the plaintiff. The burden to prove costs, however, falls on defendant in unjust enrichment 
claims, while it remains with plaintiff in claims of lost profits. To prove unjust enrichment, once 
the fact of damages has been proved, plaintiff bears only the responsibility to prove the quantum 
of sales, although plaintiff may rebut the testimony of defendant on cost issues.  
In Johnson v. Jones, the court determined that once the plaintiff in a copyright infringement suit had 
met the burden of establishing infringer’s gross revenue, the burden then shifted to the infringer to 
prove expenses to deduct from that amount. In the absence of such proof, the plaintiff was entitled to 
recover the infringer’s gross revenue from the infringement. It was not enough that the infringer testi-
fied as to the average profit margin, as infringement may allow the infringer to recognize net profit at 
a much larger profit margin percentage of its gross revenue than in the absence of infringement.225   
In On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., a copyright case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals narrowed the 
definition of revenues to be used in the damage claim, stating “we think the term ‘gross revenue’ 
under the statute means gross revenue reasonably related to the infringement, not unrelated reve-
nues.”
226
 In arriving at its decision, the Ninth Circuit relied in part on the Seventh Circuit’s 1983 
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decision in Taylor v. Meirick, which held that the copyright owner was entitled to profits of the 
infringer related to infringed product sales, but not on everything the infringer sold. Therefore, to 
establish a prima-facie case, the copyright owner should show the infringer’s gross sales of in-
fringing products.227 Notably, the Seventh Circuit in the Taylor case explained its logic in inter-
preting the statute as follows: “If General Motors were to steal your copyright and put it in a 
sales brochure, you could not just put a copy of General Motors’ corporate income tax return in 
the record and rest your case for an award of infringer’s profits.”228 
Consistent with the discussion above on incremental costs, some courts accept as deductible ex-
penses only those costs directly attributable to the production, distribution, performance, or dis-
play of the infringing work. For the infringer to deduct such expenses, it should prove them with 
a reasonable degree of “specificity.”229 In some federal circuits, the acceptable profit measure is 
not incremental profit; rather, it is based on a full recognition of the costs related to the infringe-
ment, including overhead and fixed costs. Some courts, however, have refused to recognize cer-
tain overhead costs. The attorney should provide guidance to the analyst in this area. 
A trademark owner is only entitled to receive infringers “profits” under Section 35(a) of the 
Lanham Act; in other words, the infringer’s net revenues. Determining which costs are deducti-
ble from gross revenues to arrive at an infringer’s profits, however, is not an easy task. There are 
a number of competing standards for measuring appropriate cost deductions. Under the differen-
tial cost rule, sometimes referred to as the incremental approach, only specific costs that would 
not otherwise have been incurred but for the production of the infringing goods are allowed as de-
ductions. Fixed costs, such as rent for manufacturing facilities, would not be deducted. Only vari-
able costs, such as the raw materials and the labor that actually go into manufacturing the infring-
ing product, are allowed as deductions. This is the most favorable rule for trademark owners.  
The direct assistance rule is a variant of the differential cost rule that is more generous to in-
fringers. Under the direct assistance rule, costs that directly assisted in the production of the in-
fringing goods are allowed as deductions. The benefit to infringers under this rule is that some 
elements of overhead and general administration are permitted deductions. This is the approach 
taken under the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.  
The fully allocated cost rule, sometimes referred to as the full absorption approach, is even more 
generous to infringers. Under this rule, all expense items properly allocated under generally ac-
cepted accounting principles to production of the infringing goods are allowed as deductions.230 
The analyst should seek the guidance of counsel on the rules that apply in the relevant jurisdiction. 
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2.4.6.2. Apportionment 
The Copyright Act, the Lanham Act, and the UTSA each provide that in an unjust enrichment 
claim, the intellectual property owner shall recover only the net profits of the infringer attribut-
able to the infringement. By comparison, in a lost profits claim, all of the profits derived from in-
fringing sales are awardable as damages. As a result, in an unjust enrichment claim, only the por-
tion of profits from infringing sales that can be ascribed to the intellectual property in question 
are to be awarded.  
Similar to the issue of proving deductible costs, in an unjust enrichment claim, it is defendant’s 
responsibility to prove the deduction from sales to adjust for the apportionment of profits to the 
various assets that contribute to the sale of an infringing item. Plaintiff may rebut the testimony 
of defendant on this issue. 
Some examples of factors relevant to apportionment are:  
1. Costs of capital. 
2. Intellectual property elements. 
3. Business reputation. 
4. Quality and functionality of product. 
5. Manufacturing ability. 
6. Marketing and advertising. 
7. Hotel guest accommodations. 
8. Restaurants. 
9. Talents of producers/directors/performers. 
Many other factors can and should be considered in determining the appropriate apportionment.  
Since apportionment is required in a disgorgement claim but not in a lost profits claim, a plaintiff 
typically will attempt to prove lost profits when capable of doing so. Apportionment is also not 
required in statutory damages.231 
In general, courts recognize the inherent difficulty in analyzing apportionment. As a result, they 
tend to require greater certainty in proof of the existence of damages, and exhibit somewhat 
greater flexibility in the proving of apportionment. 
2.4.6.2.1. Apportionment Based on Cost. Apportionment should be done on the basis of relative 
value. In economics, it is common to find that the relative cost or price of a component or ele-
ment is a fair measure of its relative value. That is, something that costs twice as much is often 
worth twice as much. If that is true for a particular product, it may be reasonable to apportion 
profits in proportion to the cost of the components. 
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Other cost-based apportionment methodologies may involve elements other than cost of goods 
sold. For example, in a copyright case involving advertising, the relative cost (and volume) of in-
fringing advertising to total advertising may be one step in the apportionment process. Since a 
portion of the value of the good being advertised may come from its inherent quality and desir-
ability, and another portion may come from the advertising, the analysis may also include the 
relative cost of advertising as a whole compared to the cost of goods sold.  
Cost-based apportionment is inappropriate if the cost of some elements may not represent their 
value. This is particularly true if valuable elements are obtained at no cost (for example, because 
they are already owned by the infringer) or if the cost or value of the elements are not easily 
measured, such as the value of a brand name. For example, in Columbia Machine & Stopper 
Corp. v Adriance Machine Works,232 the expert attempted to apportion a machine’s profits to the 
infringing element by using a fraction dividing the cost of the infringing part by the total cost of 
the machine. The court, however, rejected this approach, finding that part cost was not a fair 
measure of the relative contribution of the infringing element. 
2.4.6.2.2. Alternative Non-Infringing Hypothetical Market.  This methodology calls for the 
creation of a hypothetical supplementary yet non-infringing product with a resulting estimate of 
the profit created by this product. Under this method, the expert would subtract the hypothetical 
non-infringing profits from the actual profits made during the sale of infringing products and ap-
portion the difference to the infringing feature. 
2.4.6.2.3. Volume Basis.  In some cases, the volume of the infringing elements as a portion of 
the total work is a rational basis for apportionment. For example, in Frank Music,233 the perform-
ing act that used the infringing music constituted approximately 12 percent of the show’s weekly 
running time, and the court attributed 12 percent of the show’s profits to the infringement.234 
There is, however, no bright line rule.  
For example, in Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, the defendant used copy-
righted materials in a compilation set.235 The defendant argued that because the infringing por-
tion comprised 10 percent of the total collection, the plaintiff was entitled to 10 percent of the 
total profit. The court found this method unacceptable, because the product was marketed as a 
complete collection and the absence of the infringing material would have had a substantial ef-
fect on the overall value of the product. The court ultimately awarded 50 percent of the profits 
based on the infringed materials, reasoning that the additional products would be purchased to 
complete the collection. 
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Similarly, in Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int’l, the defendant packaged multiple 
video games on a single Nintendo cartridge, and the expert argued that because 33 percent of the 
games packaged on a cartridge were Nintendo games, 33 percent of profits was an appropriate 
apportionment.236 The court rejected that argument, reasoning that since the entire cartridge was 
marketed as a Nintendo product, the plaintiff had received the benefit of the Nintendo trademark 
on all games included on the cartridge.  
2.4.6.3. Stacked Royalties 
The question of the value of intellectual property is complicated if the defendant has expenses 
(either real or imputed based on its own intellectual property contribution) for other intellectual 
property used with the product in question. For example, if the product uses other patented tech-
nology or earns premium pricing due to a trademark, it may be appropriate to consider the other 
contributory intellectual property assets in the apportionment analysis.  
The court addressed this issue in Integra v. Merck.237 In that case, plaintiff’s patents related to 
segments of certain proteins that, by interacting with certain receptors on the surfaces of cells, 
induced better cell adhesion and growth aimed at promoting wound healing. Integra was awarded 
$15 million in reasonable royalty damages at trial. On appeal, the Federal Circuit found that the 
number of patent licenses needed to develop a drug may also affect the value placed on any sin-
gle technology used in the development process and remanded the case to the district court for 
further proceedings. On remand, the court reduced the damages to $6.375 million.  
Stacked royalties can also apply to the determination of a reasonable royalty if multiple licenses 
exist with a single product. 
2.5. OTHER DAMAGE CALCULATIONS 
In addition to compensatory damages in the form of lost profits, reasonable royalties or unjust 
enrichment, augmented damages in excess of the compensatory measure of recovery may be 
awarded in appropriate cases. Augmented damages may include enhanced statutory damages 
and punitive damages.238 
Certain intellectual property damage statutes permit the award of enhanced damages at the discretion 
of the court. For example, in a patent case, upon a finding of willful infringement, the court may 
award up to treble damages plus attorney’s fees and costs. In trademark disputes, a court may enter 
judgment, according to the circumstances of the case, for any sum above the amount found as actual 
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damages, not exceeding three times such amount. If the court finds that the amount of the recovery 
based on lost profits is either inadequate or excessive, the court may in its discretion enter judgment 
for such sum as the court finds to be just, according to the circumstances of the case.239 
In a copyright matter,240 the defendant who prevails may be awarded attorney’s fees against the 
plaintiff.  
2.5.1. Market Value 
If neither lost sales nor a reasonable royalty have an empirical basis, an infringed copyright 
owner may employ the market value test as an alternative measure of actual damages. The mar-
ket value test estimates the fair market value that a willing buyer would have paid a willing seller 
for the use of a work. 
Applying the market value test, a number of courts determine the value to the infringer for the 
use of the copyrighted work, rather than the value a willing buyer and willing seller would have 
negotiated. Although this difference may at first blush seem semantic, it can make a substantial 
difference in the determination of value. 
There are two instances in which the market value measure of the copyright owner’s damages is 
generally employed, namely (1) if the defendant infringer or defendant’s infringement has harmed 
the reputation or the value of the copyrighted work for a particular market, or (2) if (a) the defen-
dant has made no profits from the infringement, (b) the copyright owner has no proven lost sales, 
and (c) the circumstances of the market make the probability of a negotiated license unlikely.241 
The copyright owner’s actual damages may consider the “extent to which the market value of the 
copyrighted work at the time of infringement has been injured or destroyed by the infringe-
ment.”242 This concept was applied in Montgomery v. Noga. In that case, actual damages for in-
fringement of a copyrighted computer program were awarded based on the impact of the in-
fringement on the value of an unregistered version of the program that had been derived from the 
copyrighted program. The court ruled that in determining the magnitude of the injury to the value 
of the registered copyright at the time of infringement, the value of the protected program would 
not be determined solely by reference to the market value of the copyrighted program as a stand-
alone product.243 
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2.5.2. Statutory Damages 
2.5.2.1. Statutory Damages for Counterfeit Trademarks  
In cases involving the usage of a counterfeit trademark, the plaintiff may elect, prior to the court 
rendering final judgment, to recover not less than $500 nor more than $100,000 per counterfeit 
mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale or distributed, as the court considers 
just.244 Alternatively, if the court finds that the use of the counterfeit mark was willful, the plain-
tiff may elect, prior to the court rendering final judgment, to recover not more than $1 million 
per counterfeit mark per type of goods or services sold, offered for sale or distributed, as the 
court considers just.245 A counterfeit mark is defined as:  
(i) a counterfeit of a mark that is registered on the principal register in the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office for such goods or services sold, offered for sale, or distributed 
and that is in use, whether or not the person against whom relief is sought knew such mark 
was so registered; or (ii) a spurious designation that is identical with, or substantially indis-
tinguishable from a designation as to which the remedies . . . are made available . . .246  
With respect to domain names, the plaintiff may elect, prior to the court’s entry of final judg-
ment, to recover in lieu of actual damages or profits, an award of statutory damages in the 
amount of not less than $1,000 and not more than $100,000 per domain name, as the court con-
siders just.247   
2.5.2.2. Statutory Damages for Copyrights  
The Copyright Act allows the plaintiff to obtain statutory damages if the copyright owner is un-
able to prove his actual damages or the defendant’s profits. The statutory amount of damages is 
to be: 
in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court considers just . . . In a 
case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that 
infringement was committed willfully, the court in its discretion may increase the award 
of statutory damages to a sum of not more than $150,000. In a case where the infringer 
sustains the burden of proving, and the court finds, that such infringer was not aware 
and had no reason to believe that his or her acts constituted an infringement of copy-
right, the court in its discretion may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of 
not less than $200.248 
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2.5.3. Corrective Advertising  
In fixing damages, courts may take into consideration the cost of a corrective advertising cam-
paign the trademark owner conducts in order to repair the effect of the defendant’s misleading 
advertising. The purpose of such a campaign is to correct any misimpressions that were formed 
in the marketplace due to the infringers’ actions and thereby return the plaintiff to a preinfringe-
ment state.  
For example, in U-Haul International, Inc. v. Jartran, Inc., the trial court awarded damages 
twice the amount of the original false ad campaign.249 In Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. The Good-
year Tire & Rubber Company, the court held that corrective advertising damages were equal to 
25 percent of the defendant’s advertising expenditures in the relevant market. In reaching its 
conclusion, the court based its analysis on the Federal Trade Commission guideline that often re-
quires businesses engaging in misleading advertising to spend 25 percent of their advertising 
budget on corrective advertising. 250  
It is often advantageous to seek the opinion of practitioners seasoned in the art of developing ad-
vertising campaigns, such as public relations or advertising professionals, to opine on the amount 
of corrective advertising required to reverse customer confusion or the adverse impact of infringe-
ment. Analysis of the advertising levels expended by the parties to the suit may also be probative. 
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3. CONCLUSION  
This Practice Aid provides the practitioner with a discussion of the theoretical, legal, economic, 
and accounting foundations of intellectual property and the methodologies commonly employed 
in the calculation of infringement damages. Notably, the United States courts continue to award 
damages in intellectual property cases under a variety of theories and analyses, giving the dam-
ages expert freedom to explore the economic consequences of the infringing activity. As in cal-
culating damages under any civil cause of action, the expert should carefully consider the facts 
and circumstances of the dispute at hand.  
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APPENDIX A: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PRINT AND  
ELECTRONIC RESOURCES (NONEXHAUSTIVE LIST) 
PERIODICALS AND PUBLICATIONS 
There are many periodicals and publications that either discuss the valuation of intellectual prop-
erty assets or contain market information regarding the sale, transfer, or exchange of intellectual 
property. Although it is not within the scope of this Practice Aid to identify all of the potential 
sources for this kind of information, some recommended sources include the following: 
• Intellectual Property Law: Damages and Remedies, Terrence P. Ross (2004), Law Journal 
Press, 105 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10016, www.lawcatalog.com.  
• Licensing Economics Review, 155 Gaither Drive, P.O. Box 1050, Moorestown, NJ 08057. 
• Les Nouvelles (a Journal of the Licensing Executives Society). Alexandria, VA. Licensing Ex-
ecutives Society (U.S.A. and Canada), Inc., 1997. 
• Intellectual Property Strategist. Leadership Publications, New York. 
• Licensing of Intellectual Property. Jay Dratler, Jr. New York: Law Journal Seminars-Press, 
1994. 
• Licensing a Strategy for Profits. Edward P. White. U.S.A.: Licensing Executives Society 
(U.S.A. and Canada), Inc., 1997. 
• Technology Licensing: Corporate Strategies for Maximizing Value. Russell L. Parr and Patrick 
H. Sullivan. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996. 
• Intellectual Property Infringement Damages: A Litigation Support Handbook. Russell L. Parr. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1993. 
• Valuation of Intellectual Property and Intangible Assets. Gordon Smith and Russell Parr. New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994, 2nd Edition. 
• Valuation of Intellectual Property videocourse. Joseph A. Agiato and Russell L. Parr. New 
York: The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Inc., 1996. 
• Valuation of Intellectual Property Course Handbook. Joseph A. Agiato and Russell Parr. New 
York: AICPA Publication, 1996. 
• Investing in Tangible Assets: Finding and Profiting From Hidden Corporate Value. Russell L. 
Parr. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1991. 
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• How to License Technology. Robert C. Megantz. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996. 
• Licensing Intellectual Property: Legal, Business and Market Dynamics. John W. Schlicher. 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1996.  
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
A number of national and local professional organizations provide information on intellectual 
property matters. The more popular national organizations include the following: 
• Licensing Executives Society 
• American Intellectual Property Law Association 
• Intellectual Property Owners Association 
• International Intellectual Property Alliance 
• National Association of Plant Patent Owners 
• National Council of Intellectual Property Law Associations 
• Patent and Trademark Office Society 
• International Trademark Association 
• International Collegiate Licensing Association 
The contact information for these professional organizations is included in Appendix B, “Intel-
lectual Property Professional Associations,” to this Practice Aid. The source of this data is a pub-
lication entitled National Trade and Professional Associations of the United States, issued by Co-
lumbia Books, Inc. It is updated annually to incorporate any changes to existing listings or the 
addition of new organizations. 
INTERNET SITES 
A number of Internet resources are available to the analyst to access market information relating 
to businesses and intellectual property matters. Although it is not possible to list all potential 
sources of information, the following represents a sampling of Internet sites that may prove useful: 
• www.census.gov (United States Census Bureau) 
• www.copyright.gov (United States Copyright Office) 
• www.fvgi.com (The Financial Valuation Group)  
• www.hoovers.com (provides company financial data) 
• www.inta.org (International Trademark Association) 
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• www.lesi.org (Licensing Executives Society International) 
• www.royaltysource.com (Royalty Source) 
• www.usa-canada.les.org (Licensing Executives Society — USA, Canada) 
• www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s searchable database of 
filings) 
• www.uspto.gov (U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s searchable database of patents and trademarks) 
• www.ggmark.com/#State_Trademark_Law (U.S. State Trademark Laws and Databases) 
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APPENDIX B: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROFESSIONAL  
ASSOCIATIONS (NONEXHAUSTIVE LIST) 
American Intellectual Property Law Association  
2001 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 203 
Arlington, VA 22202 
(703) 415-0780, Fax (703) 415-0786 
International Trademark Association 
655 Third Avenue, 10th Floor 
New York, NY 10017 
(212) 768-9887, Fax (212) 768-7796 
American Society of Composers, Authors  
   and Publishers (ASCAP) 
1 Lincoln Plaza 
New York, NY 10023 
(212) 621-6000, Fax (212) 724-9064 
Inventors Workshop International Education  
   Foundation 
1029 Castillo Street 
Santa Barbara, CA  93101 
(805) 962-5722, Fax (805) 899-4927 
Association of University Technology Managers 
60 Revere Dr., Suite 500 
Northbrook, IL  60062 
(847) 559-0846, Fax (847) 480-9282 
Licensing Executives Society (USA & Canada) 
1800 Diagonal Rd., Suite 280 
Alexandria, VA  22314 
(703) 836-3106, Fax (703) 836-3107 
Business Software Alliance (USA) 
1150 18th St. NW, Suite 700  
Washington, D.C. 20036 
(202) 872-5500, Fax (202) 872-5501 
Los Angeles Copyright Society 
1800 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 900 
Los Angeles, CA  90067 
Copyright Society of the USA 
352 Seventh Ave., Suite 739 
New York, NY 10001 
(212) 354-6401, Fax (212) 354-2847 
National Association of Patent Practitioners  
   (NAPP) 
4680-18-i Monticello Ave., PMB 101 
Williamsburg, VA 23188 
(800) 216-9588, Fax (757) 220-3928 
Intellectual Property Owners Association   
1255 23rd Street NW, Suite 200  
Washington, DC 20037 
(202) 466-2396, Fax (202) 466-2893 
National Association of Plant Patent Owners  
1000 Vermont Avenue, Suite 300 
Washington, DC 20005 
(202) 789-2900, Fax (202) 789-1893 
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International Collegiate Licensing Association 
http://nacda.collegesports.com/nacda/ 
   nacda-contact.html 
National Council of Intellectual Property  
   Law Associations  
c/o Procter and Gamble 
11520 Reed Hariman Hwy. 
Cincinnati, OH 45241 
(513) 634-4782 
International Intellectual Property Alliance  
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Suite 825 
Washington, DC 20006 
(202) 833-4198, Fax (202) 872-0546 Patent and Trademark Office Society 
P.O. Box 2089  
Arlington, VA 22202 International Licensing Industry  
   Merchandisers’ Association 
350 5th Avenue, Suite 1408 
New York, NY 10118 
(212) 244-1944, Fax (212) 563-6552 
Patent Office Professional Association 
742 S. 26th St. 
Arlington, VA 22202 
(703) 305-3000, Fax (703) 308-0818 
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APPENDIX C:  
SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL  
PROPERTY CASES 
Case Name Subject 
A & L Technology v. Resound Corp., 1995 WL 415146 (N.D. Calif. 1995) Patent 
Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 898 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir.1990) Patent 
Allen-Myland v. International Business Machines Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1014 (Third Cir. 1991) Copyright 
Alpo v. Ralston-Purina, 997 F.2d 949 (D.C. Cir. 1993) Trademark 
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 821 (1984) 
Patent 
American Medical Systems Inc. v. Medical Engineering Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1370  
(E.D. Wis. 1992) 
Patent 
American Original Corp. v. Jenkins Food Corp., 774 F.2d 459 (Fed. Cir. 1985)  Patent 
American Sales Corp. v. Adventure Travel, Inc., 862 F.Supp. 1476 (E.D. Va. 1994) Trade Secrets 
Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 823 F.2d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1987)  Patent 
Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Electronics, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1041 (N.D. Me. 1992) Patent 
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (Third Cir. 1983), cert. 
denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) 
Copyright 
Ara Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Replacement Top Co., 377 U.S. 476 (1964) Patent 
Arriflex Corporation v. Aaton Cameras, Inc., 220 U.S.P.Q. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) Patent 
Atlantic Thermoplastics Co., Inc. v. Faytex Corp., 970 F.2d 834 (Fed. Cir. 1992) Patent 
Austin-Western Road Machinery Co. v. Disc Grader & Plow Co., 291 F. 301 (Eighth Cir. 
1923), cert. denied, 263 U.S. 717 (1924) 
Patent 
Bandag, Inc. v. Gerrard Tire Company, Inc., 704 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Patent 
BASF v. Old World Trading Co., 41 F.3d 1081 (Seventh  Cir. 1994) Patent 
Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061 (Fifth Cir. 1982) Patent 
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Case Name Subject 
Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing and Litho. Co., 899 F.2d 1171 (Fed. Cir. 1990), 
and 923 F.2d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
Patent 
Best Cellars, Inc. v. Wine Made Simple, Inc., LJG Wines, Inc., 320 F.Supp.2d 60 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) 
Trademark 
BIC Leisure Prod. v. Windsurfing Int’l, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 224 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) Patent 
Bio-Rad Laboratories Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604 (Fed. Cir. 1984),  
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984), and 807 F.2d 964 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied,  
482 U.S. 915 (1987) 
Patent 
Big O Tire Dealers, Inc. v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, 561 F.2d 1365  
 (Tenth Cir. 1977) 
Trademark 
Bose Corp. v. JBL, Inc., 112 F. Supp.2d 138 (N.D. Mass. 2000) Patent 
Bott v. Four Star Corp., 807 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1986) Patent 
Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F.Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986) Copyright 
Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1992)  Patent 
Brunswick v. U.S., 36 Fed. Cl. 204 (Fed. Cir. 1996) Patent 
Business Trends Analysts, Inc. v. Freetonia Group, Inc., 887 F.2d 399 (Second Cir. 1989) Copyright 
Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1986) Patent 
Central Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Patent 
Century Wrecker Corp. v. E. R. Buske Manufacturing Co., Inc., 898 F. Supp. 1334 (N.D. 
Iowa 1995) 
Patent 
Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695 (Fifth Cir. 1981), 
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982) 
Trade Dress 
Columbia Machine & Stopper Corp. v. Adriance Machine Works, 79 F.2d 16  
(Second Cir. 1935) 
Patent 
Comair Rotron, Inc. v. Nippon Densan Corp., 49 F.3d 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1995)  Patent 
Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Electric USA, 868 F.2d 1251 (Fed Cir. 1989) Patent 
Crystal Semiconductor Corp. v. TriTech Microelectronics Int’l, Inc., 246 F.3d 1336  
(Fed. Cir. 2001) 
Patent 
CVI/Beta Ventures, Inc. v. Tura LP, 905 F. Supp. 1171 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) Patent 
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Case Name Subject 
Datascope Corp. v. SMEC, Inc., 879 F.2d 820 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 1024 (1990) 
Patent 
Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) Patent 
Deere & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 710 F.2d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Patent 
Del Mar Avionics, Inc. v. Quinton Instrument Co., 836 F.2d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Patent 
Devex Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 494 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1980), aff’ d, 667 F.2d 347 
(Third Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 648 (1983) 
Patent 
Digital Communications Assoc., Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp., 659 F.Supp. 449 (N.D. 
Ga.1987) 
Copyright 
Duraco Products, Inc. v. Joy Plastic Enterprise Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (Third Cir. 1994) Trade Dress 
Egry Register Co. v. Standard Register Co., 23 F.2d 438 (Sixth Cir. 1928) Patent 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) Copyright 
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 72 F.3d 857 (Fed. Cir. 1995) Patent 
Fonar Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543 (Fed. Cir. 1997) Patent 
Frank Music Corp. v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 772 F.2d 505 (Ninth Cir. 1985) Copyright 
Fromson v. Western Litho. Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1988) Patent 
Gargoyles, Inc. v. U.S., 37 Fed. Cl. 95 (Fed. Cir. 1997) Patent 
General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., 461 U.S. 648 (1983) Patent 
Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified, 446 
F.2d 295 (Second Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 870 (1971) 
Patent 
GNB Battery Tech., Inc. v. Exide Corp., 886 F. Supp. 420 (D. Del. 1995) Patent 
Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Overman Cushion Tire Co., 95 F.2d 978 (Sixth Cir. 1937), 
cert. denied, 306 U.S. 665 (1939) 
Patent 
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966) Patent 
Grain Processing Corporation v. American Maize-Products Company, 185 F.3d 1341  
(Fed. Cir. 1999) 
Patent 
Gustafson, Inc. v. Intersystems Indus. Products, Inc., 897 F.2d 508 (Fifth Cir. 1990) Patent 
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Case Name Subject 
Gyromat Corp. v. Champion Spark Plug Co., 735 F.2d 549 (Fed. Cir. 1984) Patent 
Hanson v. Alpine Valley Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Patent 
Hartness International, Inc. v. Simplimatic Engineering Co., 819 F.2d 1100 (Fed. Cir. 1987) Patent 
Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Airport Holiday Corp., 683 F.2d 931 (Fifth Cir. 1982) Trademark 
Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corp. v. U.S., 591 F.2d 652 (Ct. Cl. 1979) Patent 
Hughes Tool Co. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 816 F.2d 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 
484 U.S. 914 (1987)  
Patent 
Hyatt Roller Bearing Co. v. U.S., 43 F.2d 1008 (Ct. Cl. 1930) Patent 
In re Dahlgren Int’l, Inc., 811 F.Supp. 1180 (N.D. Texas 1992) Patent 
In re Mahurkar Patent Litigation, 831 F.Supp. 1354 (N.D. Ill. 1993), aff’d, 71 F.3d 1573  
(Fed. Cir. 1995)  
Patent 
Integra Lifesciences v. Merck, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003) Patent 
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel, 253 F.3d 695 (Eleventh Cir. 2001) Patent 
International Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696 (Third Cir. 1957) Trade Secrets 
Jenn-Air Corp. v. Penn Ventilation Co., 394 F. Supp. 665 (E.D. Pa. 1975) Patent 
Johnson v. Jones,149 F.3d 494 (Sixth Cir. 1998) Copyright 
Kalman v. The Berlyn Corp., 914 F.2d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1990)  Patent 
Kaufman Co. v. Lantech, Inc., 926 F.2d 1136 (Fed. Cir. 1991)  Patent 
Kearns v. Chrysler Corp., 32 F.3d 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 1392 (1995) Patent 
King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 
1016 (1986) 
Patent 
King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941 (Fed. Cir. 1995) Patent 
Kori Corp. v. Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc., 761 F.2d 649 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. 
denied, 474 U.S. 902 (1985) 
Patent 
Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 785 F.2d 292 (Fourth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 
479 U.S. 820 (1986) 
Patent 
Lam, Inc v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056 (Fed. Cir. 1983)  Patent 
Leinoff v. Louis Milona & Sons, Inc., 726 F.2d 734 (Fed. Cir. 1985) Patent 
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Case Name Subject 
Lessona Corp. v. U.S., 599 F.2d 958 (Ct. Cl. 1981) Patent 
Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 895 F.2d 1403 (Fed. 
Cir. 1990) 
Patent 
Livesay Window Co. v. Livesay Industries, Inc.,251 F.2d 469 (Fifth Cir. 1958) Patent 
Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, 456 F.Supp. 531 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff’d, 592 
F.2d 651 (Second Cir. 1978) 
Copyright 
Lummus Indus., Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp., 862 F.2d 267 (Fed. Cir. 1988)  Patent 
McRoberts Software, Inc. v. Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557 (Seventh Cir. 2003) Copyright 
Mackie v. Rieser, 296 F.3d 909 (Ninth Cir. 2002) Copyright 
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Systems, Inc., 917 F.2d 544 (Fed. Cir. 1990)  Patent 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)  Patent 
Marsh-McBirney, Inc. v. Montedoro-Whitney Corp., 882 F.2d 498 (Fed. Cir. 1989)   Patent 
Mathis v. Spears, 857 F.2d 749 (Fed. Cir. 1988) Patent 
Micro Chemical, Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119 (Fed. Cir. 2003) Patent 
Micro Motion, Inc. v. Exac Corp., 761 F.Supp. 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1991) Patent 
Midgard Corp. v. Todd, 107 F.3d 880 (Tenth Cir. 1997) (unpublished opinion) Trade Secrets 
Milgo Electronics Corp. v. United Business Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 645 (Tenth Cir. 
1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1066 (1980)  
Patent 
Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 903 F.Supp. 1204 (E.D. Tenn. 1995), aff’d, 95 
F.3d 1109 (Fed. Cir. 1996) 
Patent 
Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559 
(Fed. Cir. 1992) 
Patent 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 915 F.Supp. 1333 (D. Del. 1995)  Patent 
Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282 (Eleventh  Cir. 1999) Copyright 
Nickson Industries Inc. v. Rot Mfg. Co. Ltd., 847 F.2d 795 (Fed. Cir. 1988) Patent 
Nintendo of America, Inc. v. Dragon Pac. Int’l, 40 F.3d 1007 (Ninth Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
515 U.S. 1107 (1995) 
Trademark 
Northlake Marketing & Supply, Inc. v. Glaverbel, 72 F. Supp.2d 893 (N.D. Ill. 1999) Patent 
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Case Name Subject 
On Davis v. The Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152 (Second Cir. 2001) Copyright 
Orthman Mfg. Inc. v. Chromalloy American Corp., 512 F.Supp. 1284 (C.D. Ill. 1981) Patent 
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 
F.Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) 
Patent 
Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211 (Fed. Cir. 1995) Patent 
Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (Sixth Cir. 1978) Patent 
Paper Converting Mach. Co. v. Magna-Graphics Corp., 745 F.2d 11 (Fed. Cir. 1984) Patent 
PepsiCo, Inc. v. William E. Redmond, Jr., 1996 WL 3965 (N.D. Ill. 1996) Trade Secrets 
Pfizer, Inc v. International Rectifier Corp., 218 U.S.P.Q. 586 (C.D. Cal. 1983) Patent 
Pitcairn v. U.S., 547 F.2d 1106 (Ct. Cl. 1976) Patent 
Playboy Enterprises, Inc v. P.K. Sorren Export Co., 546 F. Supp. 987 (D.C. Fla. 1982) Trademark 
Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d. 1481 (N.D. Mass. 1990), aff’d, 17 U.S. 
P.Q.2d 1711 (D. Mass. 1991) 
Patent 
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 (Second Cir. 1961) Trademark 
Qualitex Co., v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159 (1995) Trademark 
Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 788 F.2d 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1986) Patent 
Railroad Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 
U.S. 871 (1984)  
Patent 
Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853 (1989) Patent 
Ristvedt-Johnson, Inc. v. Brandt, Inc., 805 F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ill. 1992) Patent 
Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1995), cert. denied,  
516 U.S. 867 (1995) 
Patent 
Rockwood v. General Fire Extinguisher Co., 37 F. 2d 62 (Second Cir. 1930)  Patent 
Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301 (Second Cir. 1992) Copyright 
Rude v. Westcott, 130 U.S. 152 (1889) Patent 
Ryco Inc v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988) Patent 
Schneider (Europe) AG v SciMed Life Systems, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 813 (D. Minn. 1994), aff’d, 
60 F.2d 839 (Fed. Cir. 1995) 
Patent 
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Case Name Subject 
Scott Paper Co. v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 1051 (D. Del. 1984) Patent 
Scripto-Tokai Corp. v. Gillette Co., 788 F. Supp. 439 (C.D. Cal. 1992) Patent 
Service Recorder Co. v. Routzahn, 24 F.2d 875 (N.D. Ohio 1927) Patent 
Shamrock Technologies Inc. v. Medical Sterilization Inc., 808 F.Supp. 932 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) Patent 
Shiley, Inc. v. Bentley Laboratories, Inc., 225 U.S.P.Q. 1013 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 794 F.2d 
1561 (Fed. Cir. 1986) 
Patent 
Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, 119 F.Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. 
Wash. 2000) 
Trade Secrets 
Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus. Inc., 932 F.2d 1453 (Fed. Cir. 1991)  Patent 
SmithKline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Labs. Corp., 926 F.2d 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Patent 
Snellman v. Ricoh, Co., Ltd., 862 F.2d 283 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491  
U.S. 910 (1989)  
Patent 
Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Genco Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Patent 
Standard Manufacturing Co., Inc. and DBP, Ltd. v. United States, 42 Fed.Cl. 748 Patent 
Stanfield v. Osborne Industries, Inc., 52 F.3d 867 (Tenth Cir. 1995) Patent 
State Indus., Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 1022 (1990) 
Patent 
Steiner Corp. v. Benninghoff, 5 F.Supp. 2d 1117 (D. Nev. 1998) Valuation 
Stickle v. Heublein, Inc., 716 F.2d 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Patent 
Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 891 F.Supp. 751 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) Patent 
Stuart Hall Co. v. Ampad Corp., 51 F.3d 780 (Eighth Cir. 1995) Trade Dress 
Studiengesellschaft Kohle, v. Dart Industries, Inc., 862 F.2d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1988)  Patent 
Sun Studs, Inc. v. ATA Equipment Leasing, Inc., 872 F.2d 978 (Fed. Cir. 1989)  Patent 
Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112 (Seventh Cir. 1983) Copyright 
Tektronix, Inc. v. U.S., 552 F.2d 343 (Ct. Cl. 1977) Patent 
Tights, Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 442 F. Supp. 159 (M.D.N.C. 1977) Patent 
Total Containment, Inc. v. Environ Products, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1355 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff’d, 
106 F.3d 427 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
Patent 
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Case Name Subject 
Trans-World Mfg. Corp. v. Al Nyman & Sons, Inc., 750 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1984) Patent 
Trell v. Marlee Elects. Corp., 912 F.2d 1443 (Fed. Cir. 1990) Patent 
Trio Process Corp. v. L. Goldsteins Sons, Inc., 533 F.2d 126 (Third Cir. 1976) Patent 
TWM Manufacturing Co., Inc v. Dura Corp., 789 F.2d 895 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 852 (1986)  
Patent 
Two Pesos Inc. v. Taco Cabana Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) Trade Dress 
U-Haul v. Jartran, 793 F.2d 1034 (Ninth Cir. 1986) Trademark 
Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983) Patent 
Uniroyal, Inc. v. Rudkin-Wiley Corp., 939 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1991) Patent 
Unisplay S.A. v. American Electronic Sign Co., 69 F.3d 512 (Fed. Cir. 1995) Patent 
Wang Laboratories Inc. v. Mitsubishi Electronics America, Inc., 860 F.Supp. 1448  
(C.D. Cal. 1993) 
Patent 
Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco Ltd., 850 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 968 (1988) 
Patent 
Weinar v. Rallform Inc., 744 F.2d 797 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985) Patent 
Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab. Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (Third Cir. 1986) Copyright 
Yale Lock Mfg. Co. v. Sargent, 117 U.S. 536 (1886) Patent 
Yarway Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268 (Fed. Cir. 1985) Patent 
Ziggity Systems, Inc. v. Val Watering Systems, 769 F.Supp. 752 (E.D. Pa. 1990) Patent 
Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996) Patent 
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